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Abstract
This report is an exploratory discussion of the prospects for private sector investment in
development initiatives. Based on a set of structured and unstructured inieroieu», a press review
and a survey of the releoant literature, the report paints to a gnrJJth in the areas of commonality
between the worlds of investment and development, in ihat there is increasing recogniticm of the
need to direct resources to South Africa'S poor at the same time as market forces are starting to
play an enlarged role in development. The report argues however, that the social corsexi in which
investors are 'embedded' is very ~lifferent from that if development practitioners, hiNting to a
situation in which development projects are seen as risky investments. The dijjicuJty' 't':x'~erienced
lJ1:1 private investors in understanding the world of development is identified by the report as the
single largest obstacle to private seaor investment in development. The report draws the
conclusion that mediating institutions are required to structure relationships between
development agents and investors.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
'Economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about
how they don't have wl.y choices to make.'
James Duesenberry 1960: 233
The extreme differences in opportunities for people of different racial a .d social groups
in South Africa is widely recognised. A sure indicator of the sharp divisions that
characterise our society is the fact that South Africa has the highest Gini co-efficient in
the world (McGregor 1994: 359). The accession of ~}jeAfrican National Congress to
power has made this legacy of inequality and polarisation the focus of state activities.
Through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)I development that
targets the needs of the most disadvantaged sectors of South Africa's population has
been identified as the key priority for the new post-apartheid state. This is distinct from
policies which promote economic growth at any cost, in the belief that the benefits of
such growth will 'trickle down' to poorer sections of the population.
The RDP proposes drawing previously excluded sectors of South African society (for
example women and rural people) into the mainstream, and making them the
beneficiaries of developmental activities. Other groups which have historically benefited
from such processes in. the past have included the white working class and rural
Afrikaners (O'Meara 1978).
Despite the plans prepared by the new goverrunent, it is not clear exactly how the
proposed programme will be financed. Because of its relatively high GDP, South Africa
will not qualify for grants or soft loans from internation.allending institutions such as
the World Bank or the IM}..'(Business Day 3 October 1994). With the exception of
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transitional assistance, South Africa will also be increasingly ineligible for other forms of
development aid from the North, and will consequently rely on loans aru, other
conventional financing instruments.
Important national resources were committed by the National Party government to
'free-market' enterprise in South Africa. The best examples of this are the Industrial
Development Corporation {IDC} and the SmaIl Business Development Corporation
(SBDC). There was '0.0 commitment to using these resources in the 'public interest' -
assuming that such t.< thing exists (,MacKirltosh1992) - with the same types of criteria
guiding these organisations as those which would have informed private investment
houses. For example, the roc argues that, because it is self financing, it need not behave
like a public corporation, targeting the most disadvantaged or pursuing unprofitable
activities (BusinessDay 3 July 1994).
There iswidespread recognition of the urgent need for successful development projects
in South Africa, but the ways of fina.'1dng these were not clear, particularly while the
RDP was simply an election manifesto rather than a prograrnme which had to be
implemented. Prior to the April 1994 election, social analyst Steven Friedman (1994)
undertook an exercise inwhich he compared the economic proposals emanating from
business and the previous state w' .11 those of the 'liberation movement' (meaning the
A.NC and other progressive political groups). He contrasted the Development Bank of
South Africa's Vfu-lOUS proposals and the state's Normative Economic Model with the
RDP and the report prepared by the Macro Economic Research Group (now the
National Institute for Economic Policy). His conclusion was that there is a wide gulf
between them: the former proposed liberalisation and deregulation, while the latter is
premised on state intervention and ambitious spending. However, he went on to argue
that' even if there is corflict over economic policy there is wide consensus on the need
for substantial development spending' (1994:8).
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Since the election, there is widespread consensus on t.;'e need for a greater national
commitment to development. The differences that appeared so stark to Friedman before
the ANC's accession to power have already become less noticeable, BiAa:e the election
the private sector and development processes were MO separate. realms that were best
addressed through separate discourses and by different people within the ANe: the
urbane Thabo Mbeki could be relied upon to comfort edgy investors, while fiery trade
unionist Jay Naidoo could speak to people desperately in need of the kind of assistance
promised in the RDP.
This is no longer the case. There is greater recognition that if there is to be any point in
investing inSouth Africa, greater resources must be dedicated to the poor who threaten
political and economic stability. It is also recognised that the finance for such
developmerx will have to come from two interlinked sources: the reallocation of funds
from existing public sector budgets, which; according to RDP commissioner for the
PWV, Ben Turok, will in turn be used to leverage private sector sources of finance
(Sowetan 28 September 1994). If development interventions in South Africa are to be
successful and if a developmental approach is to take hold in a sustainable fashion,
private investment indevelopmental type projects on a scale unknown in South Africa is
going to be required.
"Ibis means that the private sector is not only going to have to finance black
homeownership in areas traditionally perceived as high risk, but they are also going to
have to finance less tangible investments with lower (or longer term) rates of return. As
Minister Jay Naidoo puts it: "The private sector neeos to shed its mantle of piety and
omniscience and put its money where its mouth is. Permanent jobs must come from
private sector investment in the productive sector. South African businesses'
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commitment to the RDP can't just be the transformation of their social responsibility
programmes into RDP 'fronts" (Sunday Times 6November 1994).
The original RDP document argued that the "democratic government cannot fund the
RDP without support from the private sector ... [and that] the democratic government
must modify regulations and support innovative financial institutions and instruments
that will fund the RDP' (1994: point 6.5.14). It went on to claim that 'if excessive risk
aversion prevents them from taking up socially responsible investments, the democratic
government should consider some form of legislative compulsion, such as prescribed
assets' (point 6.5.15).
The slightly threatening tone of the initial document has been amended in the recently-
released RDP Wlute Paper: the market has been drawn into the centre of processes,
rather than serving as an auxiliary engine, while any mention 0:: prescribed assets and
mechanisms for enforcing private sector participation have been dropped', Generally,
the RDP has become a more market- and private investor-friendly document.
The Star unsurprisingly supports the shift in emphasis: 'the Wbite Paper differs from
the RDP pre-election document. The change is subtle but identifiable in the form of a
shift in emphasis towards a formula that has characterised the world's successful
economies: namely curtailing government's role in the economy and, by implication,
greater freedom for the private sector to get on with the job of creating wealth for the
nation' (23 September 1994). The shift is not only noticeable at the level of ideology, but
also in the language that is used in the programme: 'Naidoo is also learning an
1 An exception to this was a warning issued by adviser to Minister Naidoo, Pierre
Voges, that 'legislation might be necessary to get the private sector involved in the RDP'
(Business Day 3 November 1994). However, this was more of an appeal for innovative
form of partnership than threatening prescribed assets.
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appropriate new language: interspersed with the usual language of development
(consultation, consensus delivery), he talks about business plans, adding value, fiscal
control, change management and even 'systematic performance auditing" (Weekly Mail
August 191994).
This change in the orientation of the development sector, previously hostile to market
forces, provides the focus for this project: will private investors take up the role required
of them if the RDP is going to work? Will they put funds into potentially risky
investments in order to assure South Africa's longer term future? Or are Soutl African
investors so used to placing their funds insafe and secure options like shopping malls in
Sandton and Anglo American shares that they will not support the RDP?
The problem investigated in this project is suggested in the term 'risk aversion': is
investment in human and social development too 'risky' to the private sector? Private
sector investment in reconstruction and development is necessary for the RDP to
succeed, yet the processes required for development to take place are not ones in which
the private sector has experience or capacity. There are significant differences in the
ways actors L.'1. investment and development understand their roles and responsibilities,
leading to a disjuncture between the worlds of private sector investment and
development.
In order to encourage an interface between business and development initiatives, the
social dynamics of this disjuncture need to be examined. This project looks at how
actions in both development and investment operate, and what the constraints to
successful cooperation between the two are. The arenas in which these actions take
place will also be examined. The international experiences of development as well as the
PDP as a guideline for state development activity over the next five years will be drawn
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upon, while interviews with investment decision makers are coupled with a review of
the financial press to gain a sense of how investors see their role and the future.
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY AS A FRAMEWORK
The literature used in. this project draws primarily on that which has emerged around
the sociology of economic life. As Granovetter and Swedberg put it, this body of
literature represents 'a recent and very exciting development: the opening up of the
academic debate about the economy to include a genuinely social perspective' (1992:4).
The central arguments of 'economic sociology', as presented by Granovetter and
Swedburg, are the following:
* Economic action is a form of social action,
* Economic action is socially situated, and
* Economic iastitutions are social constructions (:6).
These authors trace a long and distinguished lineage f(..":the development of what they
call 'economic sociology', drawing on the work of Auguste Comte, through to Emile
Durkheim and Max Weber. While Durkheim sharply criticised economists' tendency to
radically isolate their topic from everything social, he was never as concerned with
economics as Max Weber. The most important contributions by Weber to this area were
his books Economy and Sociery and General Economic History, both of which are still
fundamental texts for analysts who wish to understand the socially produced nature of
economies.
While other important SOciological writers, such as Joseph Schumpeter, continued to
write on economic matters, the divide between economics and sociology widened
through the course of the twentieth century. Only the work of American authors like
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Talcott Parsons prevented the two disciplines from parting ways altogether. Parsons'
attempts to deal with the issue of social order (as posed by Hobbes) involved
developing an "oversodalised' conception of man, distinct from the utilitarian tradition
of which Hobbes was a part (Granovetter 1992: 55). Parsons' views have become
increasingly unfashionable, and have been labelled functionalist by those who dispute
the manner in which he sees people as 'obedient to the dictates of consensually
developed systems of norms and values ..: (ibid).
The single most important attempt to provide a social understandiez of economic issues
in the latter part of twentieth century was undertaken by' exiled Hungarian
anthropologist, Karl Polanyi. In his seminal text The GrEat TransformatiQn (1944), he
argued that the nineteenth century ushered in an utterly new form of society, in which
the 'self-regulating market', itself a social and ideological construct ..became dominant
Polanyi's key concern was the change from a social production system, in which the
inter-dependence of different social groups was recognised, to the SpeenhamIand
system, introduced in England in the 1830s, inwhich the market was not regulated by
any mediating institutions such as community obligations. The Speenhamland system
saw the introduction of 'debtors jails', and removed the obligation of communities to
take responsibility for non-productive members. His interest in this change led him to
examine the social relations in which an economy is 'embedded'. This notion of
embeddedness is the central theoretical foundation of economic sociology, and forms a
key concept drawn. uponin the project.
Polanyi's emphasis on the social elements of business transactions is a very powerful
critique of neo-dassical approaches to economics. Neo-classical economics is based on
the idea that economic actors base their actions on 'rational choice in conditions of
scarcity within an exchange-based market economy' (Lazar 1993: 6). Martinelli and
Smelser summarise the assumptions made by neo-c1assical economists:
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(a) the individual actor will behave insuch a way as to maximise his or her material
well-being, or utility, in economic transactions,
(b) buyers and sellers will possess full knowledge of the availability and prices of
products, job opportunities, and other market conditions, and
(c) buyers and sellers, possessing preferences and full information, will act
rationally on these.
These assumptions can be summarised as: (a) actors maximise utilities, (b) actors nave
full knowledge, and (c) the postulate of rationality (Martinelli and Smelser: 1990).
Economic sociology rejects these assumptions, arguing that the maximisation of utilities
depends on the context, which shapes opportunities and constraints; that rationality is
socially defined; and that information is never complete.
Between the publication of The t;JfeatTraJ.}Sformatkm,and the early 19805,there were
few advances in the field of economic sociology.However, in the decade since then, it
has become crowded: Cranovetter and Swedburg identify a number of different
approaches to structuring the relationship between sociology and economics: Rational
Choice Sociology which applies the assumptions of neo-classical economics to
understand the decisions people make; New Economic Sociology; Socio-Economics;
Psycho- Socio- Anthropo-Economics which aim to develop a multi-disciplinary
approach to economics; and Transaction Cost Economics (1985:4).
In his article 'Economic Action and Social Structuxe: The Problem of Embeddedness'
(1985),Mark Crannovetter successfully enlarged on the idea of embeddedness using the
idea of social networks which connect economic actors with one another, thereby
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ohighlighting the nature of economic transactions as inherently social events. He also
draws attention to the importance of understanding social relations if sense is to be
made of many economic transactions.
The notion of embeddedness is crucial to this project and its find'ngs, Development
is a concept which bFgets the poor, the disadvantaged and the marginalised, while
investment is a process undertaken by those with resources to spare in an attempt to
generate a return. It will be shown that a yawning chasm exists between the social
context of private investors and that of development actors, and that lliis is the single
most important inhibiting factor preventing successful cooperation between the two
sectors.
Lazar (1993) suggests that neo-classical economics is fatally damaged because it fails to
treat economic action as sodal action, which is inextricably linked to power
relationships. The focus of neo-classical economics on the individual freedom of contract
obscures such power relationships, which are a feature of all social action. The strength
of the analysis offered by Karl Polanyi is that he posits economic action as 'embedded,
and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic' (in Granovetter and
Swedburg 1992: 34). Polanyi's argument in The Great~ is that 'the
outstanding discovery of the recent historical and anthropological research is that man's
economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships' (1957: 46).
Lazar argues that the 'sociological concept of embeddedness implies that, when. it exists,
the economist's economic rationality is the product of a whole series of social and
ideological conditions' (1993:6). This project identifies some of the tensions present in the
relationship between the private sector and development practitioners, arguing that the
context from which investors .:merge limits their ability to interact with development
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»projects (and vice versa), not because they are not committed to the ideals and goals of
development, but because the processes and practices required for development are so
tar from their own experiences that they have no reference points to assist them in their
interactions.
This approach to economics is controversial: in one of the analyses of South African
capitalism, Belinda Bozzoli argues that the need to generate profit is art objective reality.
Despite the ideologies and hegemonic forces designed to legitimate profit maximisation,
she argues .•there is an immutable, "bottom line' -fhe unquestionable imperative of profit
,',
generation ~~975).While it must of course be conceded that the bottom line does exist,
the approaJlh taken here is that it is socially constructed, and that profits can be
i'
generated blr1l'Leat1S which do not necessarily have to accord with investment managers'
views of w~~tis rattona'.
if
Investment in a low-return housing project may not seem rational to rapacious global
investors keen to see the highest return on their capital, but to township residents who
hope their children will benefit through the provision of affordable housing, investment
in such an instrument would seem highly rational, particularly if it was through a
pension Orprovident fund inwhich they were shareholders. Another example is that of
a member of a small ethnic group who buys inputs from another member of the same
group, despite a higher price. The value of established networks and the strength of
kinship ties; in that transaction raake it a rational one, because profit is not the only
variable considered.
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OTHER WRITINGS ON PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN
DEVELOPMEl\Vf
Management writers have addressed themselves to the question of private sector
participation in development. For example, the Innes Labour Brief, a management-
oriented briefing publication deals regularly with development issues. (It is no
coincidence that its publisher was formerly a prominent member of the Sociology
Department at the University of the Witwatersrand.) The limitation of this kind of
publication is that it is driven by its subscribers, and prevented from being too critical of
the people who pay substantial amounts to receive intelligence and advice.
The other group which has focused on the intersection between private sector
investment and development is the growing group of ethically managed financial
institutions and their policy bodies. The number of such institutions is limited in South
Africa, with Southern Life and the Community Growth Fund (managed by Syfrets)...
being the two only real investment instruments available to small pnvate investors.
Writing on the issue by these institutions is limited.
In Britain, the providers of ethical financial services to individual investors and larger
corporate investors generate an amount of research and analysis on these and other
issues. In the United States, there are many pension funds which operate in an ethical
fashion, determined by their members wishes. The Pensions and Investment Research
Centre based in the UK, .ci well as the scarce literature produced by South Africans such
as Anthony Asher (1990; 1991), head of Wits' Actuarial Sciences department and
Chairman of the Community Growth Fund are SOfie of the few resource available to
scholars interested in the area of ethical investment.
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The publications these organisations generate are often interesting but utilitarian: they
concern methods for quantrying ethics, and have a purpose, such as evaluating
performance internal to a prospective recipient of investment - the whole field of
corporate governance is a central concern to ethical investors, often leaving aside the
'lv::::.>jon of their ability to interact with other agents',
2 The King Commission which released its report inNovember 1994 investigated the
issue of corporate governance. Based on the UK's Cadbury Commission, it proposes a
system of self-regulation through peer pressure, which seems optimistic given South
African business's tradition of collusion and secrecy.
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RESEARCH METHOD
This project was prompted by the view that the East Asian model will not work for
South Africa, and that more consensual forms of decisionmaking, with a greater role for
the private sector in public development is required. The East Asian model is of a
repressive state heavily involved in buttressing an intense, private sector-led
industrialisation. drive. This model is unlikely to take hold in South Africa. It is
undemocratic and expensive, neither of which the new government can afford. If
development is to last, it must be seen in the same way as investment: a long term
commitment to a process which offers a certain return over a certain period.
In undertaking qualitative research, a number \.. different research strategies always
present themselves, and it is a matter of selecting not only that which will deliver
useable findings, but also one which is implementable. In addition to this, the research
method must be appropriate to the anticipated findings. 'The principal difficulty
associated with this research related to problems in gaining access to respondents and
institutions. The investment sector is concerned almost exclusively with returns on
capital, and time is seen as a scarce commodity that cannot be squandered on activities
unrelated to meeting the demands of the bottom line... such as participating in
interviews with students of sociology,
Inthis case representivity was not the primary consideration. The project did not aim to
come up with a verifiable, hard set of data to be used to measure the likelihood of
private sector investment in development. Instead, the absence of research on which the
project could build made it necessary to accept that the findings would necessarily be of
a tentative and exploratory nature.
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While a case study was initially planned, two factors made this a less feasible research
method:
* difficulties with access made it virtually impossible to use a single investment
house as a research subject. At the time the research was initiated (prior to the
election) the socio-political environment was highly charged and tense. It can
only be assumed that fears of exposure for discriminatory investment practices,
such as redlining for example, made investment houses quite so reluctant to
expose themselves to scrutirq-, Over a number of months, unsuccessful attempts
to secure a case study ultimately led to the abandonment of this as a research
method.
* Itbecame apparent during the attempts to secure a single case study that this in.
fact was not the best approach to identifying the prospects for private sector
investment in development. Investment is quite such an idiosyncratic activity,
with different firms using very different types of services and functioning in
unique ways. These are usually moulded by their individual client needs,
leading to the conclusion that a broader look at the investment community
would be more useful than an analysis of a single institution.
For these reasons it was decided to use a 'triangulated' research method, using three
methods. TIle first of these was interviews with three groups of investment decision
makers from different institutions (rather than looking in-depth at a single institution).
The three groups of investment decision makers were:
* merchant bankers
investment managers for life offices
stockbrokers and stockbroking analysts.
*
*
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Sixteen of these interviews were undertaken using a semi-structured interview
schedule. Each interview lasted between forty five and ninety minutes. Respondents
were identified using a snowball method' - a more systematic way of selecting
respondents simply was not possible given difficulties with access, and in hindsight the
s(J-ategy seemed to have been effective enough to generate useable findings, The sector
is in fact so small, that many of the respondents were able to offer insights into other
respondents, information which was often not volunteered', A further six interviews
were undertaken on an unstructured basis, looking at general issues, such as corporate
social investment and public affairs from a corporate perspective.
Attached as Appendix One and Two respectively are a list of the respondents and the
interview schedule.
Giddens has argued that interpretive sociology has failed to conceptualise institutional
analysis adequately (1976: 158), and that 'this has caused a number of problems in
relating meaning to action, and in distinguishing between intended action and
unintended outcomes' (Chataway 1992:48). The question this leads to iswhether talking
to managers and decision makers and trying to deduce how they make their decisions
3 The technique for identifying respondents was not only a 'snowball' one: a
confidential list of participants at an ANC-convened investment conference was
discovered by the researcher, and this generated approximately one third of the
respondents. These respondents then suggested others and so on. This is mentioned
because it could imply that many of the respondents were sympathetic enough to the
ANC to participate in one of their functions prior to the election. One could conclude
that if the findings have arty general bias, it is a positive one and that the picture painted
in this research report may be overly-optimistic.
4 An example of this is that one of the respondents, a prominent analyst at a leading
stock broking firm claimed he was emigrating to Australia because he felt affirmative
action would reduce his children's opportunities. Another respondent informed the
researcher that in fact he was leaving the country following the traumatic murder of a
close family friend outside his office in a criminal incident.
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will reveal their 'true' motivations. However, Interviews still represent the most
accessible form of deducing these motivations.
The second leg of the research involved analysing what 'development' means in the
contemporary South African context. This was undertaken by reviewing international
literature on the issues, while the nature of the local debates is introduced by looking at
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the most systematic statement of
development priorities and methods ever offered in South Africa. Nuances and
subtleties in the RDP could be identified by looking at differences between earlier drafts,
the final version of the document published by the ANC and comparing all of these
with the White Paper.
Finally, the third leg of the research method was a comprehensive scan of the press,
looking at all coverage of RDP and development issues, with particular reference to any
coverage ofbusiness participation in the PDP. Publications covered inthis scan :included
the Business Day, the Sunday Times, The Star, Finance Week, the Financial Mail, the
Weekly Mail and Guardian, the Citizen, the Sowetan, as well as one-offpublications put
out by organisations. Prospectuses and brochures put out by broking firms, banks and
the other institutions as well a" their briefing documents were also used. Submissions
made by organisations, such as SACOBand BIFSA,to the RDP, were also reviewed.
TIle press review was useful in identifying slufts in development debates, particularly
with regard to how the RDP has changed its status from a party political election
manifesto to what Professor Jackie Cock calls its elevation to 'Talmudic status' (public
lecture: September 1994). Even Jay Naidoo says that 'the Reconstruction and
Development Programme has become the mantra of South Africa'! (Sunday Times 6
November 1994).
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THE RESPONDENTS
Sixteen respondents were interviewed according to a semi-structured interview
schedule, in addition to six interviews undertaken on an unstructured basis. These last
interviews dealt with corporate social investment and general public affairs issues inbig
corporations.
Inorder for the interviews to have real meaning, it was necessary for the respondents to
be senior enough to be decision makers. This made it more difficult to gain access to
appropriate people, but over time this was possible. (A list of respondents and their
positions is attached as Appendix One.) It was anticipated that the more senior
respondents would generate more useful findings. This was not the case: for example
the Anglo American respondent was very senior, but also very predictable and cautious
in his responses. It became clear that the more useful responses came from people with
sante experience outside the :investment sector, such as Mr Daan Waandrag (see below)
and political analyst, Mr Gary van Staden.
The investment decision makers interviewed were all white men, mostly from an
English-speaking background, but approximately one third were Afrikaners. The fact
that all the respondents were men was not coincidental: the sector is male-dominated,
and it is rare to find women employed 1.'1. senior investment posts. (Of the three women
approached for interviews, none was prepared to participate.) It also became apparent
that the few women involved in senior investment roles tend to be active at the head
offices of the financial institutions, which are mostly inCape Town.
Inall, during the research, seventeen corporate offices were visited. The culture of these
institutions is very much. as one expects it to be: women occupy secretarial and support
posts, while blacks are found mainly in driver and messenger functions. Every
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interview respondent wore a tie, and generally the atmosphere in investment houses is
of discreet wealth. TIle workplace culture is very formal and rigid, while security
measures are often startlingly thorough.
The personal backgrounds of the respondents are not surprising: mostly they have
attended 'good' government schools, studied eithe»~ the liberal English campuses or at
Pretoria or Steilenbosch universities, q_'!':.;:!; ita"'.etaken degrees in commerce.More details
regarding the relationship b~w~en their views and their personal backgrounds are
provided in the body of the report.
One of the respondents, Daan Wandrag, is worth. mentioning individually. He is the
Director of Theta Securities responsible for Socially Desirable Investments (SDI).Mr
Waandrag has been involved in f:Li.estructuring of nearly every big SDI deal in South
Africa, and it is therefore worth looking at his background in some detail. He described
his background as follows:
'1 was born and bred in the heart of conservatism, in a small town called
Kuleni where I matriculated in 1969 from Kuleni Hoerskool. I went to
Tukkies where I did a B. [uris, and I have done various other diplomas
since then. The most recent was a Higher Diploma in Company Law at
Wits Business School.No, I didn't do a CA - in fact I am the only non-CA
in our company. After my studies I started as a magistrate inPretoria, and
after 18 months of it I resigned. I joined Barclays as a teller and worked
my way up and spent 15years there. I worked in every aspect of the bank,
and was part of their Executive Training Scheme, and participated in their
internal audit. I was transferred around: from Graskop to Pretoria, I
landed up in Treasury in Johannesburg, then in Research and
Development into new financial products, and in 1988 I joined UAL.
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The interesting point about MrWandrag is that he is one of few respondents involved in
the finance sector who has experience outside of business, even if he does not come from
a liberal background. This must have some bearing on his unusual ability to mediate
between the development and business communities. This substantiates the general
argument of this project that the social context in which investors are embedded is so
far removed from that of development, that intermediaries are required. Mr Wandrag is
able to be quite such an effective intermediary because of his diverse experience - he is
not (only) embedded in the world of country clubs and holidays at Plercenburg Bay.
THE STRUCTURE OF 1HIS REPORT
Swedburg, Himmelstrand and Brolin (1987), in their paper 'The Paradigm of Economic
Sociology - premises and promises' provide a very useful framework for tmplemerutng
an economic approach to sociology. They examine neo-classical theory and economic
sociology respectively according to seven points of divergence. These are:
1. the concept of the actor - the separate utility maximiser versus the social actor;
2. the arena of action - the separate economy versus the social economy;
3. types of economic action - formal rationality (with emphasis on choice and
maximisation) vs social rationality and social economic actions ingeneral
4. the results of economic action - equilibriated harmony versus tension filled
interest struggles
5. view of the analyst - objective outsider against an objective insider
6. concept of time - stationary and adaptive time concepts versus a socio-historical
time concept
7. general scientific method - predictions and explanations based on radical
abstractions against those based in empirically adjusted abstractions.
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Swedburg et al offer a set of lenses through which to examine the economic realm - one
which focuses on actors and actions. This way of understanding economic actions from
a social perspective is used in this project in a simplified form to analyse the findings of
the research. Confronted with a rich set of data, Swedburg et al offered a way of
interpreting it by focusing attention on two of the key questions asked in economic
sociology: who acts in the e~onomy, and what do they do? The answers to these
questions offer a 'socially textured' view. of economic actions that could inform policy
and planning.
Based on the framework offered by Swedburg et al, this report discusses the actors and
actions involved in the investment process in a way that shows how those actors see
their own actions. The structure of the research report reflects the central questions
asked in the research:
* If the state, market forces and i:1:1P. third sector are the three key actors involved in
the development process, how do investors see lem and the prospects for
cooperation between them?
* What are the arenas, types and results of action undertaken in investment and
development? How do investors particularly view those actions, and do they
anticipate being able to collaborate with development actors?
The dual focus on actors and actions provides the structure of this report', Chapter Two
provides an overview of the research and sets out the general arguments. Chapter Three
5 The distinction between actors and actions is often difficult to apply in practice: the
market, for example, is treated here as both an actor and an arena, which may be
slightly confusing. This approach was necessary since so much is ascribed to the market,
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looks at development and investment actors, and how investors view the possibilities of
fruitful cooperation across the two sectors. Chapter Three looks at where actions take
place, what those actions are, as well as their results. Chapter Four offers some
concluding remarks.
that it becomes both a source and a site of action. Rather than seeing this as a limitation
of the study, it should be viewed as drawing attention to the enormous power ascribed
to market forces, itself an interesting finding.
21
CHAPTE!R TWO: GENERAL OVERVIEW
The general finding of this report is that while the private sector is committed to
development, and is supportive of its general objectives, the differences in social
contexts make it virtually im-iossible for investo.s to understand how development
operates and what its dynamics are. This draws attention to the usefulness of the
concept of embeddedness; private sector investors inhabit a world so removed from that
of development, with its gritty problems of water and sanitation, capacity building and
poverty, that they simply do not understand the development sector. At the same time,
development actors emerged as part of a movement which saw itself in opposition to
business because of its perceived closeness to the apartheid state. The suspicion and
mistrust inherent in the development-private sector relationship is one of the primary
constraints on future cooperation.
Some convergence is taking place: market forces are mentioned more often in RDP
plans, such as the White Paper and the various discussion documents, while
development issues are increasingly being addressed by business: the JSEproposes the
structuring of a new development board on which certain kinds of developmental
businesses can be listed, while publications like Finance Week now have a regular
section devoted entirely to development. This growing together is important and
encouraging, but the chasm remains: investors tend to be wealthy white men;
development actors are more likely to be blacks from a disadvantaged background. This
simple difference is critical.
The conclusion drawn here is that there is a need for mediating institutions which can
structure relationships between investors and development actors. One kind of agency
which plays such a role is Theta Securities. Formerly associated with UAL Merchant
Bank, it is now entirely independent and acts as a 'financial boutique' operating in the
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wholesale end of the financial market. Its clients are generally institutions and
parastatals, and the areas in which it works are strategic planning, offshore financial
management (especially structured debt swaps) and socially desirable investment. It
structured both Electrification Participation Notes issues for ESCOM, and was active in
putting the Sugar Bonds and the CHIPS issue together. The enormous success it has
already enjoyed has clearly been achieved because of its ability to straddle the huge
divide between the two sectors.
INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS
The processes by which development is undertaken has gone through a number of
stages, from the massive, state led and internationally financed dams, roads and airports
to more delicate and painstaking processes such as capacity building and Participatory
Rural Appraisal. A consensus has gradually developed over the years on the need for
communities to be centrally involved in decision making. There is also increasing
recognition of the fact that making resources available to people does not help them if
they do not have the capadty to manage those resources effectively.
Amongst the emergent development principles and trends is that of consultation: more
energy is put these days into assuring that projects are appropriate and what target
communities desire than was the case before. Consultation systems are used to develop
priorities, rather than assuming that development professionals (tiways know what local
people want. Another trend which is fast becoming a development principle is that of
quantification: as 'indicators' become an important part of all development
interventions, there is a growing desire to be able to measure impacts and assess the
contribution of donors to outcomes. Comprehensive planning systems are used to
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prepare development programmes: ZOPP (Objectives Oriented Planning) and the
Logical Framework Approach are two of these systems (NORAD 1991t.
For development to succeed, painstaking processes of consultation, and initial
assessment need to be undertaken. Careful planning and prioritisation need to take
place, with education and training often used as complementary processes required to
ensure that project beneficiaries are best placed to make use of the goods and services
delivered to them by development authorities. This con.rasts with the world of
investment, where time is of the essence, and decisionsneed to be made more quickly.
Investment decisions rely on the individual discretion of Investment managers, although
some institutions are more decentralised than others, To reach the position of senior
investment manager ..~quiresextensive experience in a position with less authority, end
would generally also require a postgraduate degree (usually an Honours degree;
Masters degrees, except for MBAs, rue less common) in finance, investment or business
administration. Having reached the senior post of investment manager, however, one is
expected to be able to make decisions and act decisively. 'Once established, investment
managers can do what they like, but if they mess up, they're out' (Interview: GS).
Investment managers would have had to prove themselves over an extended period of
being capable of exerting such powers before they are granted.
There is usually a supervising body, such as a Board of Directors, which has overall
authority to ratify investment decisions. According to the respondents, it is unusual for
6 These systems involve drawing up problem statements, turning problems into
objectives, an.d devising activities that meet those objectives.Quantitative indicators are
then devised which enable donors to assess performance. A central objection to such
planning systems is their stress on these quantitative indicators, which mask social and
qualitative issues.
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decisions to be contradicted once they have been made. This seems to be more a result of
the general conservatism of the decisions which get made, rather than any high level of
trust amongst Boards of Directors. It is assumed that one would not reach that position
unless one is perceived to have the skills to do the job effectively.
The methods for mrl<ing investment decisions in the development area are the same as
those used to make other investment decisions: the manager responsible has a great deal
of discretion, and would have to be able to motivacs for his support. However, having
made the decision to support a developmental project, he would be unlikely to be
contradicted.
'Flivate investment in development projects has many of the marks of
ordinary commercial transactions: we don't trust middlemen and the
deals which succeed are usually kept very confidential. The bulk of our
best work comes from us going out and finding it ourselves. Take for
example the Electrification Participation Notes: We heard ESCOM was
thinking of putting something like this together, we listened to people,
contacted them, went to see them, and designed something' (Interview:
DW).
Crucial to making investment decisions is the provision of information. Most
stockbroking firms run their own research divisions, aU of which focus on market
performance and other factors internal to a compdUY. The information which is
generated is presented in the form of prospectuses and briefing documents, and is used
by investment managers of institutional investors, such as life offices, most of which do
not maintain their own research facilities. Only one broking firm maintains its own
political analyst, and subcontracts his services to a number of other users, although a
number of broking firms draw on journalists and analysts on a free-lance basis.
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Political analyst Gary van Staden, argues that while investors think they have enough
information, they often simply do not:
'they think that performance and quantitative statistics are sufficient
There is a reluctance to give political analysis much significance - it's just
not seen as important Market performance shows that those companies
which use political analysts outperform those which do not. Many feel
that using a political consultant once a year is enough, but its not'
(Interview: GS).
As a case inpoint he mentioned an insurance company which underwrote riot cover in
Mmabatho shortly before the demise of the Mangope administration, costing the
company millions through payouts caused by thewidespread rioting.
All bankers, investment managers and broking analysts said they read an enormous
amount, and that there was always pressure on them to read more. They read all the
financial publications, such as Finance Week, Financial Mail, Business Day, The
Economist, as well as more specialised journals. Several of them mentioned reading The.
V'leeklyMail and Guardian, and said that the other major source of their information
were the prospectuses and other types of information put out by brokers and agents.
Reading and information gathering is an important component of the work undertaken
by investment professionals, and it is treated as hard, serious work to get through a
certain amount of printed material every day.
Only two of the respondents felt that there were any problems with the provision of
information. Of the two, one was involved inputting SDr deals together, and the other
was the political analyst quoted above. Inparticular, reliable information relating to the
demographic situation is particularly hard to find 'Solutions to problems are only as
good as their inputs, and often those inputs are simply not up to standard' (Interview:
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DW). The other respondents generally indicated that the problem was an excess pf
information, which they find difficult to wade through.
Information-gathering is V2ry competitive: a competition is run for the best researcher in
certain fields by the Financial Mail, and it is a competitive environment in which the
speed with which information is disseminated is crucial. Recently a number of foreign
stockbroking firms, particulary British ones, have entered partnership arrangements
with South African braking firms, primarily in the interests of sharing research capacity
(Business Day 19 September 1994),
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PRESCRIBED ASSETS
One method of encouraging private sector investment in development is the use of
prescribed assets. The early version of the RDP explicitly mentioned this as an option
(RDP:58), but has dropped references to this in the White Paper. Every respondent was
opposed in principle to prescription, but about a third were more realistic about the
need for prescription, and were fairly sanguine about it so long as all private investors
were disadvantaged to the same degree, 'Prescribed assets never achieve their
objectives: they simply create further distortions' was the typical response
(Interview:SB).
The strongest basis for opposition to prescribed assets was that it distorts the effects of
~te market "anything which is prescribed has a bad effect: you must let the market
decide' (Interview: MP). Prescription was widely seen as a form of indirect taxation ina
society in which individuals already endure a heavy tax burden.
'In. a nutshell, it's induect taxation and even worse, it taxes the people
who are saving for their retirement. And look how many union-controlled
provident funds there are, with more being set up all the time. These are
major holders of wealth for workers, and shouldn't be taxed. There is a
willingness to invest inSDr projects, but we lack projects and channels for
collection and distribution. We should wait until there is a reluctance to
invest before we prescribe. There is room in any portfolio for fixed
returns, so there is no need to force people to invest in funds with a fixed
rate of returns' (Interview: DW).
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Another argument against prescribed assets was that it is unreasonable to expect private
citizens to underwrite government projects - this was seen as a central government
function, not a role to be played by the private sector (Interview: PT).
The argument that if innovative instruments are established then investors will be found
for them. was repeated on a number of occasions, but is often a cynical rejoinder, rather
than a seriously held view. One analyst earnestly warned of the distorting effects of
prescription, and argued strongly that if instruments were established, investors could
easily be found. On being asked whether he would advise his clients to invest in a
government floated housing bond, for example, he grinned and replied '1 wouldn't put
a cent into it' (Interview: lvIP).
Despite the opposition to prescribed assets, there is a degree of acceptance that they are
often necessary.
'No-one likes prescription of any kind, but in my view that's going to be
the only way to get the buggers to do anything. Experience shows that if
you want them to do things of their own free will, then nothing happens.
These things have to be put into law. Current opinion in. financial
institutions is that prescription will happen, and while they oppose it,
they see it as preferable to some of the other more frightening options, like
nationalisation' (Interview: GS).
He suggests that fear of prescribed assets could be used as a lever to prompt investment
in key sectors.
Several respondents argue that although they oppose prescription generally, they
support the 'equal disadvantage' component of prescribed assets: 'if everyone is forced
to have a certain (,topomon of prescribed assets, 1won't be outperformed as I would be
if prescription applied to only certain types of institutions' (Interview: JR).
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One merchant banker argued tlw.t 'we may have to accept prescribed assets, but at least
we want to be able to have some choice of the areas we support. It's a bit like charity: if
you have contribute to a. charity, then at least you want to be able to choose which one'
(Interview TB).
An alternative to prescribed as~ts suggested by Daan Wandrag of Theta Securities is a
focus on an 'enabling environment', in which regulatory obstacles are removed and
risks associated with certain projects are reduced through the provision of guarantees or
by the state putting equity or risk capital into a project. He argues that investors will
then be more responsive. He points to the ESCOM issue as an example in which an
equity issue was synthetically created, and talks about a certain level of comfort below
which investors will not come in on deals.
SCALE AND TIMEFRAMES
In terms of scale and tirneframes, fundamental differences exist between the worlds of
investment and development. Investors take a long view, while development must be
seen to deliver in order to be recognised as effective. Delivery of services also often
requires small amounts of money in. order to effect improvements to peoples' lives,
while to investors, sums of under a million rand are often meaningless.
Jeremy Roberts, senior investment manager of African Life says that the minimum.
investment must be for at least five years, so market indicators, released on a quarterly
basis, are not that important to the investor in life assurance. For the investment
manager, he argues, it is trends, not variables that are important. This time horizon can
be contrasted to that of development interventions, where five years is seen as a
medium. to long term project, For investors at long term project is 30 - 50 years, while one
respondent suggested that Japanese investors take a 200 year view on their investments!
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(Interview: MB). It also was made clear that large South. African investors, like Anglo
American Corporation, take a very long view of their investments (Interview: IB). This
difference in time frames and scales contributes to the disjuncture that exists between
the worlds of corporate investment and development',
The speed with which decisions are made also divides the investment world from that
of development. 'The ability to take decisions quickly is an important hallmark of private
sector ~'~.restors: 'consultation slows decision making down, and slows performance.
Board members are given information and if they don't respond within 24 hours, we
assume they approve' (Interview: JR).
Wit:hhl. the investment sector, there are also differences between the time frames of the
private and public sectors. Head of Socially Desirable Investments at Theta Securities
says that
'in the public sector it's not unusual to take 18 - 24 months for a deal to go
through, because the decision-making systems are slow and tedious. In
the public sector there's been a shift from a top down approach to
development to a bottom up one, and the consultative process takes much
longer. I'm not saying it's a bad thing, but that's how It is. The private
sector is much quicker. There's also consultation, but people are
empowered to make decisions. Generally these guys are more decisions
oriented',
'1This contradicts a lot of work on development, particularly that on human resource
development, which argues that helping people to fulfil their potential is a long process
which could take generations to occur (see for example Joffe 1993). The point is that
South Africa's political imperatives give development in this context a very short time
horizon comparatively. In an ideal sense, development is as long term. a process as any
investment.
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This must be contrasted t:."1 the world of developmerd, where the need for extensive
consultation has become a recognised principle. The need to promote community
partidpation inall phases of project planning ami implementation through systems like
Participatory Rural Appraisal is becoming recognised. This once again highlights the
differences between the two ways of operating.
The scale of investment separates the development sector from that of investment: for
example, for UAL Merchant Bank to seriously consider an investment option, it needs-eo
be able to put R50 million into a company without causing liquidity constraints or
buying the whole enterprise (Interview: TB). Head of investment at Federated Life says
'If someone comes to see me about an investment of R50 000, I can't help
him, I can't think in those terms. But if you need fifty million - then we can
talk. Anything less is too difficult for me to manage' (Interview: DP).
For a community whose greatest need is water, R50- ';0 Rl00 000 could make all the
difference, yet investment managers camot think in such small currency. What this
points to is the fact thst investment in people through education and training, the least
costly and most effective form of developmental investment: is unlikely to be able to
access funds from private sector investors, unless they are prepared to think in terms of
establishing enormous programmes and institutions.
This suggests that there are few options for the big investment players in the
development sector, and the few that do exist would have to be in inf....astruc't ..re and
capital equipment. The recurring costs would have to come from other sources, and
since finance to cover these would not be assured, they would be bad investments. (In
any case, financing such development projects has and will continue to be the domain of
the Development Bank of South Africa.)
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An important factor which influences the time frames used by investors is the quarterly
nrts issued by unit trusts and the listings which follow by a University of Pretoria
LI'l:Vestmentanalysis institute.
'The intense pressure on funds caused by the regular reporting periods
makes it difficult to make strategic decisions. In the East profitable areas
are identified and funds pumped into them long before there is a
competitive return. This is difficult to do in a country where performance
is audited so frequently' (Interview: MP).
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CORPORATE SOCIAL INVESTMENT
A deeper understanding of corporate social investment (CSI) is required because it is the
one development area in which the private sector has been active. By getting an
overview of the sector, one can gauge whether it was a fore-runner of more sustained
participation indevelopment, or whether it continues to be a strategy for ensuring little
more than the long term viability of a capitalist system, as Mann suggests (1989). CSI has
been one of the ways through which the private sector has tried to make its commitment
to addressing social problems visible.
Trends in CSI include the establishment of CSI Trusts: SAB recently formed one called
Masib=nbane Trust which has 50% management and 50% union representation.
Pren.,e ,laS used this approach for some time, but base ~ on a committee, not a trust.
While this type of initiative is supported in many quarters, there are some more cautious
voices to be heard. It has, for instance, been suggested that 'worker representatives on
CSI Trusts tend to be conservative and self-serving (Interview: Hrvl): unless projects are
directly serving the workforce, they often do not get supported, leading to a diminished
national profile for CSI grantmakers. The trend to CSI trusts should not therefore be
read as a commitment to development, but more as commitment to equitable labour
relations, so that workers in a dispute with management cannot use the companies CSI
programmes against them, as occurred in the recent Pick 'n Pay strike (The Star 28
September 1994)
The establishment of the South African Crantmakers Association (SAGA) looks to be an
interesting initiative. The aim of the Association is to play a networking role, with
Northern NGOs as well as South African corporations as members. The decision by
some of the largest CSI sources, such as the Anglo American and De Beers Chairman's
Fund not to participate in SAGA suggest that they are wary of losing control over their
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funds, and furthermore that they do not favour an open, coordinated use of the funds
(Interview: HM). This would militate against one interpreting the formation of SAGA as
a widespread commitment by the private sector to using em funds to the best
advantage, even if this is the intention of some of the members.
The absence of any comprehensive information on the sector is a serious shortcoming
(Interview: BW). The lack of transparency on CSI issues would undermine any idea of
the funds being used in an open, developmental way. There has been a move away
from the 'benevolent giving' approach to one which is constrained by systems and
procedures. This ensures accountability, but is also quite stifling (Interview: BW).
Linked to this is the tendency to work with communities close at hand Clocalising'l and
with whom one's workforce has a connection (Interview: NS). Enlightened self interest
is starting to characterise certain aspects of CSI: pharmaceutical companies for example
are starting to target health care as their own area of support, rather than their
traditional shotgun approach (Interview: HM; KC).
The relationship between corporate strategy and CSI seems to be an underdeveloped
area of analysis: the impression gained from the interviews was that few corporations
have a sense of why their CSI role is important, beyond that it is an investment in the
future. This is connected to whether support should target projects in which the
corporate donor has no direct interest (disinterested), or whether there should be an
element of 'strategic self interest'.
Mann argues that 'in contemporary South Africa, the limited power of the state to
legitimate the social order has led business to shoulder a part of this responsibility
through its involvement in corporate social responsibility (1989: 5). He concludes that
social responsibility interventions are 'primarily political interventions aimed at the
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protection of capitalism. Indeed, they are the closest approximation that exists to a
coherent and long term political strategy on the part of the private sector' (1989: 17).
Despite the changed political context, one would have difficulty contradicting this
conclusion. CSI programmes do not indicate that the private sector is preparing to
'become mvolved in development in any big way. In fact, some respondents argued that
CSI spending should NOT complement the RDP: Dr Nick Segal of JCI for example
argues that corporations pay taxes, and getting them to fund RDP projects is in effect
double taxation (Interview NS).
In terms of the methods used in development and investment, it can be seen that there
are serious differences in the way that the two sectors work, particularly in terms of
their time frames and the scales of their operations. Consultation and accountable
decision-making characterises successful development, while a preparedness to make
decisions quickly and ruthlessly characterises successful investment. This does not
necessarily mean that they ar~ net compatible, but rather suggests the need for
intermedtate institutions to playa brokerage and facilitative role.
\1~
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CHAPTER THREE: ACTORS IN INVESTMENT A..NDDEVELOPMENT
This chapter will look at the nature of actors in development and investment
respectively. Itwill be argued that in the development and investment sectors in South
Africa, the role of the state and of the market are seen in very different ways, but that in
certain instances the two approaches share a common ground on which there is
agreement on fundamental aspects of what is needed for economic management.
In development thinking, the state is prioriti.sed as the institution with. final
responsibility for delivering basic goods and services, while for the business community
state involvement :isregarded negatively. Within this general finding, variations will be
highlighted: for example, free market ideologies are more widely supported amongst
less experienced Investmentprofessionals, while older business people are less hostile to
state activity. The pervasive spread of market relations into all spheres of life has
impacted in development too, and this is one of the ways in the two sectors are
becoming more compatible. At the same time, there exists a subtle understanding
amongst more experienced business people of the need to take a long view of
investment by investing indevelopment.
ACTORS IN DEVELOP,MJENT: THE STATE
With the end of the Second World War, the key institutions charged with the task of
maintaining peace (primarily by ensuring economic growth) were based in the modern
nation state, This included the international organisations established at Bretton Woods
(the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), which were also rooted in the
state, given that they were constituted with. states as their members. As a discipline,
'development' therefore emerged with a specific actor inmind: the state. For this reason
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if one is to look at development in the early post war period, one is to a certain extent
examining the actions of the state as the key player.
Development interventions as a separate area of activity emerged as part of the post-war
attempt.') to have the state playa regulating function. This involved ensuring that bare
minimum living standards were maintained, with the organs of the state, and
particularly its social service department.'), playing a leading role.
Approaches which prioritise the state drew on a structuralist understanding ()f society,
in which the structure and shape of society is seen to strongly affect what outcomes are
possible. The first structuralist to look at development issues were economists associated
with the United Nations' Economic Commission on Latin America (BCLA) which
undertook a comprehensive examination of the La~ American situation. Their focus on
production led them to argue that external disequilibria and the specialisation of
production in the periphery led to a situation in which terms of trade tend to move
against the interests of peripheral countries (Bell 1989). The structuralist' jaundiced view
of markets and their structural tendency to inhibit growth in peripheral countries and
bring improvements in the living conditions of the masses of the population led to an
emphasis on the state: if it had managed to playa leading developmental role in the
Second World, the argument went, it could do the same inthe Third.
The cone' usions of the leading theorists of the age suggest that to them the state could be
all things the market was not: for both Prebisch and Singer (Singer 1989), if the state led
industrialisation, it would enable Third World countries to break the cycle of reliance of
imports from the Industrialised developed world. Alexander Gerschenkron, in his
famous formulation offered a paradigm of development in which lateness was a key
issue: the later a country inc ~.Jst.ialised; the greater impact a certain number of variables
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would have, while certain other key pressures would also increase accordingly
(Cerschenkron 1962).
The economic boom of the 1960s was the appropriate time for a realisation that while
economic growth was taking place at an unprecedented rate internationally" the world's
population was not enjoying the benefits of this growth equally. South Africa of the time
is an excellent example: while growth rates were amongst the highest in the world",
South. Africa's black population was suffering one of the most brutal and repressive
periods in its history (Mo111990). Even though these theorists applied concepts drawn
from classical economics with due care, development was to them still an economic
matter, which could be evaluated with reference to changes in Gross National Product
Amongst the work which challenged this position was that of Dudley Seers and his
'Basic Needs Approach' which challenges the argument that development and economic
growth are identical concepts (Garda-Bouza 1980)•.
Seers, in leading structuralists away from a narrow economistic understanding of
development pointed to the serioi 1S negative effects that economic growth could have on
certain social groups, and drew on examples from Brazil, Puerto Rico, Pakistan and Iran
to make his case (Seers 1972;. Rather than simply concentrating on economic growth, he
argued that the realisation of human potential should be the objective of development
the meeting of physical necessities, employment, participation in government, equality,
8 Moll argues that South Africa's growth was not particularly startling during the
),9608 (Weekly Mail and Guardian 25 November 1994) and that had South Africa not
pursued the apartheid policies of the era, our =conomic performance would have been
even more startling, suggesting that racial and political inequities acted as a dampener
on performance (Moll 1989). While these arguments may be appealing, they are
ultimately counter-factual, since they cannot be disproved, and are therefore of limited
use.
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"education and economic and pc'itical independence were amongst the factors that Seers
identified as constituting the meeting of human potential, based on the argument that
economic growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for development. To Seers the
primary agency responsible for developing this human potential continued to be the
state, which for the purposes of this project makes him one of the long tradition of
theorists for whom development was an essentially statist prJject.
Another set of structuralist to look at development issues were the 'dependency
theorists': radical Latin American scholars who implicitly accorded the state a central
role in their theories by basing their analyses in the concept of the nation state. They
argued that it is only by severing the ties of dependency with the advanced
industrialised countries (AlCs) that self-determination in Latin America would be
achieved. Drawing extensively on the work of Andre Gunder Frank, the notion of an
international division into a core and a periphery once again became current.
Drawing on Frank's argument that development ismost successful when the connection
between core and the periphery isweakest, development became equated with ideas of
national independence and self sufficiency. Capitalist classes within the periphery came
to be seen as the 'comprador bourgeoisie', manipulated by the bourgeoisie of the AlCs
to exploit the working classes and peasants of the periphery, buying them off with
material rewards and racist ideologies.
Sophisticated dependency theorists such as Cardoso and Falleto (1979) came to argue
that the importance of peripheral countries' own domestic markets had been
underestimated. Other theorists, such as Irrunanuel Wallerstein (1974) developed the
idea of a world system, thereby extending his analysis beyond the nation state. This
approach was substantiated by the work of Samir Amin (1974) who argues that within
the world system, it is surplus extraction in the periphery which provides the key to
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understanding the 'development of underdevelopment', an important advance in
theories of development. More recent work has implicitly built on these analyses,
constructing arguments around the notion of globalisation (Giddens: 1976),in which the
compression of space and time is argued to have had significant impacts on sodallife
(Guille 1992).
Authors such as De Janvry (1981)and Alain Lipietz (1987)continued to use the notion of
dependency to try to make sense of changes in capitalism. De Janvry claims that the
modem nation state continues to be a central construct :in facilitating capitalist
expansion, while Lipietz argues that the periphery should be seen as a thermostat for
regulating the international economy",
What ties these authors together is their joint emphasis on the state as the key
development agent, and as offering the mosc useful and accessible principles around
which to organise the activitieswhich fall under the general banner of development.
In contrast to the uncritical views of the state expounded by so many of the early
development theorists, the state has over the past fifteen years increasingly come under
attack. With the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979and the monetarist ideologies she
forcefully brought with her, combined with the international recession and a range of
other factors, state activity outside broad framework-setting and regulatory functions
Q Lipietz's conceptual framework is based in Regulation Theory and draws on the idea
that the periphery serves an important function in current Regimes of Accumulation.
This, he asserts, is an attack on dependency theory, but the assault on his view by Alice
Amsden (1990) is so compelling that one cannot but agree with her assertion that
because Lipietz attempts to explain the periphery in terms of changes in the core, he 'is a
dependency theorist, and no more successful than they in explaining Third World
industrialisation' (ibid: 11).
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has increasingly been put on the defensive. As the fortunes of the state as a development
player have declined, so those of the market have come into the ascendency.
An additional set of critiques of the role of the state must be mentioned. There is a
widespread tendency on the part of authors who focus on the state not to 'unpack' the
black box of the state - failing to treat states as institutions in which in a number of
different interests may play themselves out. This has been left to authors such as Theda
Skocpol, who, in her book 'Bringing the State Beck In' (1989) points to the importance of
developing an analysis of the internal workings of t1).e state in order to understand how
it functions.
In a local context the work of Deborah Posel (1991), building on the analysis of Stanley
Greenberg in his book Legitimating the illegitimate (1987), serves to challenge views of
the apartheid state as an all-powerful monolith. Instead she offers a more complex
account of it as a contradictory and conflict-ridden institution needing careful analysis in
order to understand the actions committed in its name.
An extension of these critiques is the 'private interest' view of the state which claims that
as with any private institution, the state, particularly in the Third World, where it is a
less ancient institution, has its own set" of interests which require examination. Its
monopolistic tendencies lead to inefficiencies which are not accidental, but which serve
the interests of certain elites. For authors explicitly concerned with the Third World,
there is no such thing as a 'public actor' role for the state, it is rather an institution
founded in power and class relations, not an abstract concept. Mackintosh goes even
further (J.993) and charges that:in the Third World context the state serves to further
disempower the powerless.
42
Does this mean that in South Africa, for example, one couId argue that the RDP is an
attempt to empower the new state rather than communities? The state is accorded a
central role in the RDP, although it is not a crudely statist document. It argues that
'reconstruction and development require a population that is empowered through
expanded rights, meaningful information and education, and an institutional network
fostering representative, participatory and. direct democracy')'and that 'the democracy
we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions, of pruEdpatory democracy in
partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and empowered citizens' (RDP2:
120). The programme is clearly not speaking from the perspective that the State is the
only development player worth considering: 'attention must be given to enhancing the
capacity of [community based organisations] to adapt to playing a role indemocratising
and developing our society; .... while] NGOs have an important role to play in
democratising our society' (RDP2: 121).
Nevertheless, the state is accorded more importance and allocated more functions than
is internationally fashionable. For example, with regard to housing, which has so far
been the most high profile and tangible development issue since the election, the
document argues that 'although housing may be provided by a range of parties, the
democratic government is ultimately responsible that housing is provided to all' (RDP:
23). The powt is repeated throughout the document "The democratic government must
play a leading role in building an economy which offers all South Africans the
opportunity to contribute productively' (RDP2: 18).This is the general tone of the RDP:
that while other parties have a role to play, the state has final responsibility for delivery.
While implementation has not proceeded far enough to comment, the profusion of state
coordinating bodies in the section on 'Implementing the RDP' suggests that the state will
at least play a significant 'provider of last resort' role, even if other players are
encouraged to participate.
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HOW INVESTORS VlEWTHE STATE
Serious concerns about excessive government intervention in the economy are widely
held in the investment community. Investment professionals are generally strongly
opposed to the government playing an activist role in the implementation of economic
policy, and in many instances this was expressed inextreme terms using the language of
free-marketeers. Two distinct reasons for these views were offered by respondents:
1. the apartheid government's mismanagement of the economy has produced the
current economic crisis in which structural problems will plague the economy
long after the most obvious effectsof apartheid have disappeared; and
2. the African experience of government intervention in economic matters has
contributed significantly to the African economiccrisis.
To investment professionals these two experiences are indications of the need for the
state to play an extremely reduced role in the economy, and particularly in investment.
While the general view strongly opposes government intervention in economic affairs,
interesting variations were detected: more experienced businessmen and those who
come from an Afrikaans background are less hostiie to state involvement in economic
matters. This may relate to their own lived experiences inwhich the state played a very
positive role in promoting the interests of certain groups and has therefore, in their
minds, some ability to impact positively on economicmatters. It must be noted though
that this is speculative: none of the respondents made this point.
The most negative attitude to goverrunent involvement in economic affairs came from
two of the youngest respondents. One, the senior investment manager of an black-
owned life assurance company, is an aggressive, highly successful English-speaking
South African from a very privileged background, while the other is a young British
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engineer who became a merchant banker. The banker argued strongly ill favour of an
(explicitly) Thatcherist perspective on privatisation and economic Iiberalisation, Talking
of 'apartheid socialism', he vigorously defended the right of individuals to make money,
and claimed that states only serve to inhibit this individual activity (It view: SB).
For most of the respondents, the function of the state should, at most, be to establish "an
enabling environment" (Interview: DW); or alternatively an environment conducive to
'profitable economic activity' (Interview: ]R). None of the respondents made any
mention of any other social activities in which the state should playa role, a very telling
omission, which when prooed revealed that there is little support for state involvement
even in traditional areas like education. There was limited support for state-driven
essential service delivery, but in this case distinctions were made between the
responsibilities of national and local government. Respondents also differentiated
between the various types of services: for example electricity, for which users can easily
be charged through pre-paid meters, was seen as an area where market forces should be
more active, while services like water reticulation and sanitation, for which it is more
difficuJ.t to charge users, are seen as the types of services that the sta.. : hould provide,
with little room for market forces (Interview: DW). In effect, what concerns investment
professionals most is the impact the state's activities have on their ability to generate a
profit.
While there is apprehension regarding the new state, there is also a measure of relief
that we are going to be getting a government which provides frameworks and direction.
One of the older, more experienced respondents, a stockbroker, confessed that while he
JO The term 'an enabling environment' is the title of a national study undertaken by the
Development Resources Centre, into the future activities of NGOs. This is perhaps an
example of the private sector making use of ideas generated by the development
community.
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feared for the policies of the new state, and was apprehensive about the long term
viability of the RDPt ~theone good thing about [it] is that at least its a plan of some
kind ... and we have never had a plan. ... although what we in fact need is a strategy, a
plan that gives a vision but doesn't tell peoplewhatto do (Interview:MB).
Investment professionals are apprehensive about tlte-new state generally, but are/not
panicky. There Seemsto be little fear that nationalisation, for example, would become a
widely accepted practice, and the general concerns that were raised related to "macro"
economic populism', and the threat of hyper-inflation that this brings with it (Interview:
AJl, or an anti-white affirmative action programme which would disadvantage their
children (Interview; MP), This latter fear was cited as the reason why the respondent
concerned was due to emigrate five days after the interview. The overall impression was
that the investment community has accepted the new political order, but that it has
fairly predictable fears that are not urueasonable.
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THE MARKET IN DEVELOPMENT
The alternative to the state has come to be the market. The earlier history of
development as a discipline (ie until the early 197:15)was an attempt to reduce the role
of economics and the market in the field of social advancement. This was not a
successful project: in a process sanflar to that identified by Karl Polanyi i:.1 The Great
ImMfomlaUOu (1944), it is contended that the market has successfully become an
important player indevelopment.
Polanyi's work showed fuat the market system violently distorts our views of humanity
and Society. Arguing that economic determinism was a product of the 19th Century,
rather than a long-standing objective reality, Polanyi. suggested that these market-
distorted views were proving tt) be one of the main obstacles to the solution of the
problems facing our civilisation. Polanyi's wo-k showed that 'the national market was
not a gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from government
control, but quite the opposite: the market was the result of a conscious, and often
violent intervention by government' (Esteva 1993:19).In. a less traumatic, but similar
process, market relations are becoming increasingly powerful indevelopment there is a
widespread emphasis in many development initiatives to empower people to
participate in the market, through the provision of skills and support, rather than using
approaches which offer alternatives to the market, such as cooperatlv=s or communal
distribution systems.
The incursion of economic rationality into development strategies and theories has not
been an accidental process. It is rather an attempt to gain some control of a powerful
sector and demobilise its transformatory agenda. The emergence of an approach to
development which is technicist, economistic, and which maintains the starns qUQ is a
47
result of this trend. For example, the new planning systems used by international aid
agencies, such as NORAD and USAID are based in a method known as the Logical
Framework Approach, or Objectives Oriented Planning, the basic tenet of which is that
what is logical to a development planning bureaucrat in Washington is also logical to a
community worker in Bangladesh. The intention of smoothing differences and
homogentsing development problems is explicitly stated:
'The purpose of development projects is to induce change whose results
are desired within the general project environment and society at large.
We assume that there is general agreement about the improved situation
before project planning takes place. This will make it possible to agree
upon the immediate objective, and the development (overall) objective of
-the project' (NORAD 1991: 10).
A further point is the way in.which the discourse of these approaches are 'market-based:
inputs, outputs, indicators, target groups and objectives are the central organising;
concepts. The budget is the most important component, and all other aspects of
planning documents are there to justify the levels at which expenditure is set.
By injecting a market sensibility into development debates, proponents of market based
social forms have colonised a terrain which was formerly hostile to their intrusions.
Adam Smith's homogenising "invisible hand' is now accorded a central role in many
development programmes. The arguments that supply and demand are the most
effici ...nt allocators of resources suggest tl\at despite the social context, some laws are
immutable. The argument that :~is important 'to get prices right' (to give appropriate
incentives) is a prime example of economic determinism: it assumes that there ere right
and wrong prices, and that development should concern itself with getting the 'wrong'
price 'right' (see for example Lal and Wolf (1987»),.although this argument is now
widely used.)
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TIle idea that prices are socially determined is a notion which most nee-liberal analysis
lacks the ability to take on board. This is however not a general criticism of markets:
some theorists have come to sophisticate the notion of a market. Mamdani (1992) for
example argues that markets need creation and support, since they are not universal
institutions, while Toye (1987) takes the point further to argue that government
efficiency affects the workings of markets. Sen (1992), also argues that markets are
socially constructed, and that fully appreciating their complexity requires an
understanding of the social and legal structures in which they are embedded.
Messkoub (1992) argues that the flexibility and adaptability of markets, trumpeted by
their advocates, in many situations amounts, to little more than vulnerability.
In the debates about "States vs Markets', Robert Wade (1990) argues that the success of
East Asian economies can be understood in terms of their successes in 'governing the
market': he argues that market forces have been harnessed and used to 'pick winners',
which are then supported by the state. The developmental possibilities for 'governing
the market' seem enormous, and could form an exciting research agenda.
INVESTORS AND THE MARKET
The realm in which investment takes place is the market, and for this reason one can
assume that it is the environment in which investors are most comfortable. It was
assumed that respondents would support the argument that the market should drive
development as much as possible. Itwas therefore important to assess whether they saw
the market as a UvL.'1gentity that can be shaped and moulded by other pressures, or
whether It is seen as an immutable set of relations which operate identically despite the
context.
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The interviews tried to test the internal logic of the argument that markets, even South
African ones, always operate efficiently to maximise utilities, and are therefore the
institution best placed to \. -.dertake development. The questionnaire tested the notion
that markets are ruWg~ the most efficient ways of meeting people's needs.
The responses upheld the hypothesis that investors see the market as the most efficient
mechanism for meeting people's needs, and also indicated the durability of this belief.
The respondents all see the market as the best allocator of resources, but can (once de
that it is an institution which has been distorted by apartheid and had its integrity
compromised. Despite this, and despite their railings against the flabby institution the
market has become in South Africa, investors have faith in the market in ways which
would make Adam. Smith proud. The see its flaws, they see its ability to be affected by
outside forces (usually ~hrough state led interventions), but nothing shakes their bedef in
it.
Inow' current era this may sound like an obvious point, but the market has not always
been viewed in the way it is now: in her analysis of the origins, development and
ideology of local manufacturers inSouth Africa in the early part of 'dUscentury, Belinda
Bozzoli discusses the growth of protectionist ideologies amongst white businessmen of
the period. She shows how ideologies are 'sets of ideas ...which have a social use for the
particular group for whom they are developed by ideologists' (1975: 195). A market
driven ideology is therefore promoted tor particular reasons, rather than simply being
an organic reflection of popular opinion.
It is beyond the scope of this project 'to unpack the reasons why free-market ideologies
have so successfully captured the business community's imagination, but two reasons
at e suggested for this:
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* as part of the rise of the "New Right', the international trend to prioritising
markets which started with the election of Thatcher to power in Britain; and
* the success of attempts by the South African state to use free market ideologies to
legitimate itself, a strategy which has included using free market explanations to
justify its withdrawal from certain activities, such as the regulation of labour
supply, the provision of certain services, and particularly its reduced role in
financing education.
This process was suggested by Stanley Greenberg in his book Legitimating the
illegiti.ma.te, where he argued that there was a need to recognise the complexity of the
stgte, since 'the steady elaboration of state structures ... is a sy.nptom, not of effective
control, but of insufficient state pow'~r, threatened by wi]fJ1 African subjects who ...
decline to follow state direction. Stab'~ control over markets produces tensions and
contradictions that undermine and limit the imposition of state goals' (1987: xvii), It is
not suggested that the state and business share a set of common ideologists who
generate shared functional ideologies, but it is argued that the conditions were provided
locally (through the withdrawal of the state and its new support for markets) for
processes and ideologies active internationally (ie monetarism) to take root in South
Africa.
How then do local investors view our markets? Investment professionals feel that the
competitiveness of South African markets varies from sector to sector, and within sectors
as well. Incertain areas markets are seen as highly competitive, and in others not at all.
Oligopolies are seen to exist in sectors such as cement and fire protection, while
supermarkets and banking are seen. as fiercely competitive (Interview: BY).Three main
reasons for the uncompetitive nature of parts of the economy were suggested:
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1. Market Size: the South African market is seen as so small that if certain. sectors
were opened to direct competition, there would not be sufficient volume to
justify the number of participants presently active in them (Interview: JR).
.. .~-';J.ltionwas drawn to the fact that in real terms the South African market, with
an Economically Active Population (EAP) of less than 10 million people, is small
by international standards.
2. The business environment: past policy and practice is seen as having promoted
artificial conditions, in which i~w international pressures were felt, and deals
between competitors are easily struck. The term 'hot-house' was used by a
number of respondents to describe South African markets. Ute isolation of South •
Africa due to political pressures was mentioned as a particular factor here
(Interview: GS). Chairman of a leading stockbroking form, Bill Yeowart says:
'The environment over the past twenty years has been one
conducive to the formation of cartels and the creation of
closed interest groups. Import substitution and high tariff
protection creates this type of atmosphere. What we see in
South Africa are aberrations which wouldn't have taken
place inan open economy. 'Butthere are nevertheless sectors
in which there :isvery aggressive competition. While the JSE
is brutally competitive, you still find that things are quite
centralised. Six or seven firms handle sixty to seventy
percent of the transactions on the exchange' (Interview: By).
A leading market analyst, Mike Brown, argues that:
'Virtually all trades go into 25 blue chip stocks. Many of the 800
companies listed on the JSE are never bou.ght into or traded by the
institutions' (Interview: MB).
'.. '.
The absence of legislation that requires clear and transparent reporting is another
factor which contributes to a collusive business environment (Interview: MB):
huge companies like the Old Mutual are able to release one page financial
statements (because they are mutual benefit societies), thereby allowing
opaqueness to go unchallenged.
Exchange control was mentioned inevery interview as a factor contnouting to an
uncompetitive business environment in South African. [";-,+rols over the
movements of capital in and out of South Africa are seen .td preventing a
dynamic and growing economy from emerging.
3. The structure of business: The South African penchant for pyramiding in which
holding core?d.nies own a number of subsidiaries which t~PT't own other
companies has the effect of obscuring cash flows and other imp' , t facts.
Another perspective offered by political analyst Ga.ryvan Staden was that the lack of
legitimacy of the former state, combined with the international pressure for sanctions,
made the cosiness and exclusivity of the business sector seem necessary, and was in fact
functional to the survival of business interests in South Africa during the years of
isolation (Interview: GS). He argues that the way to change the current situation is to
gradually strengthen organisations which act as a counterbalance to the market to
ensure that its effectsare softened. This is similar to the argument made by David Lewis
(1994),who suggests that it is the lack of countervailing institutions which has allowed
conglomerates t(.'/ become so powerful and the market to become so closed and sluggish.
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The overall impression gained was that while investors are reluctant to concede the
point, and deny it if directly questioned, there is general acceptance of the fact that our
markets are not competitive. The reasons offered for this often inform a particular set of
solutions which favour privatisation and deregulation.
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THE THIRD SECTOR
The third sectorhas come to be seen as something of a saviour by development analysts
from both the left and the right. Rather than operate through the 'Leviathan' state, or
through the savage market, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other types of
non-profit organisations increasingly represent an alternative to either of these two stark
options.
On the right, the analysis has come to be that state delivery systems share a set of
characteristics with other state enterprises: they are monopolistic, inefficient and
ultimately a dra.in on national resources. At the root of the left critique of the state is the
private interest view of the state outlined earlier. This analysis 'extends the individualist
assumptions of orthodox economic theory from those who buy and sell in markets to all
those involved with the state. Politlcia=s, voters, civil servants are all assumed to act
solely in their own interests: .they pursue individual gain, not the public good'
(Mackintosh 1992:70).
So for analysts from the right, an alternative is needed to the state because of state
failure, while for analysts from the left, an alternative is needed to substitute for market
(and sometimes state) failure. TIleresponse has been to focus on organisations which are
neither market-based, nor located in the state: the 'third sector' comprising NGOs,
community based organisations and other serviceorganisations. Analysts who focus on
relations within the periphery and who argue that states in developing countries usually
represent local elites see voluntary organisations as countervailing forces. They are
responsive and diverse, and can be used to empower people at a grass roots level
(MacKintoshand Wainwright: 1987).
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There are different understandings of the objectives of NGOs. For t.l-:t!o)sewho believe
that the appropriate policy response to community problems is to encourage self-
reliance, NGOs are a way of putting the work of Schumacher into action. Based on the
idea that 'gifts of knowledge' will serve communities best and make them self-reliant,
people who see NGOs inthis way view them as delivery structures which will provide
the intellectual inputs to make people self-reliant There are criticisms of this approach:
that it is pot sensitive to local dynamics and fails to deal with the reasons why people
have arrived in their predicament in the first place. Itassumes that experts know what is
to be done, while in practice the intervention of experts is often inappropriate and
causes more damage to fragile social fabric than if communities had not been disturbed
by the promise of dollars in foreign aid.
The second approach is one based in the work of Paolo Freire who is credited with
introducing the concept of empowerment into social theory. For Freire, learning is a
process undertaken dialogically and in a problem posing way. His work was mostly
concerned with education, but, development workers have applied his concepts in their
own areas. They have generated a powerful idea of 'working in dialogue with the poor
to analyse their actual experiences and to do this is in terms of their oppression' (Thomas
1993: 136). The organisational home for this work must of necessity be outside the state,
based on the analysis that states have their own interests, as well as trying to act outside
competitive and destructive market relations as much as possible.
Thomas argues that whether NGOs are based on the idea of providing tools for self
reliance, or participative action research generated by the empowerment approach, their
methods are too restricted to form a general model for social transformation, NGOs are
ultimately as diverse as their members, and it is impossible to deduce One master
narrative to explain their functions, orientating and abilities. It should suffice to argue
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that their role in development is an important one, and that the intrusion of market
relations into their operations has already started to happen.
NCOs and the third sector generally is one entirely foreign to the investment
community. While they are familiar with them in their incarnation as charities, they do
not have experiences of them, or a history in which they have been active so that they
can appreciate fhelr involvement (Interview:PT). Only one of the respondents was
familiar with the acronym. NCO, and others simply shrugged off the whole sector as one
which does not concern them, and is outside their realm. A banker at a recent World
Bank conference commented that 'We just can't understand NGOs - what they do, who
works in them and how they function. Its like another world to us'. This indicates an
important point of difference between the investment community and the development
sector: that an important agent in one is almost entirely unheard of in the other.
PRESSURES ON DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT ACTORS
South African history, as suggested above, can be understood to have involved a
repressive state heavily involved in production, but increasingly relying on market
based ideologies to legitimate its actions (Greenberg: 1987). Within this framework, the
third sector has acted as the spearhead of civil society's resistance to the apartheid state.
In development terms, this has meant that enormous power has been vested in the
hands of the state, which has failed to use it in the interests of its people. As Greenberg
puts it, '[the] entanglement of state and economy inSouth Africa has left both state and
economic institutions in disrepute, without claims to universal purpose (1(987:5).
The political democratisation of South Africa can therefore be expected to produce
contradictory effects, with the new political elite both repelled and attracted by the
enormous power of the state. The RDP, as the development framework for the
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Government of National Unity, reflects this ambivalence. The Minister responsible for
the RDP, Mr Jay Naidoo, argued recently that while other agencies 'will be responsible
for aspects of the programme, 'ultimately the state must deliver' (Business Day: 17 June
1994), indicating that while the lessons of statism have been recognised, a deep seated
belief in the state as the principal agent of delivery remains, Inaddition to this it should
be noted that Naidoo comes from the union movement, which for historical reasons has
been hostile to market forces and which has played a key oppositional role. For these
reasons, the state was bound to be seen as something of a prize",
Plans for the implementation. of the RDP are still unclear, despite the release of the
White Paper, The minister responsible is a Minister without s ,,:m: sh.y, and is housed in.
the President's office, Funds for the Programme are so far or.l.-,'"those trimmed from
ether budgets (totalling R2,5 bn), and fall far short of the amounts necessary to meet
even the most basic targets. Plans for the programme are that provincial governments
will be responsible for implementation, and to this end each provincial government has
established their own RDP office.
Regional RDP offices were required to submit plans to the Minister by the end of July
1994, but few of the regional offices were able to meet this deadline. The regi.ons most on
track are amongst those which one would have expected to have had the greatest
oroblems; North West, OFS and the Eastern Transvaal. Reasons for the delays by the
other provinces included disputes over the demarcation of borders, and delays in
establishing regional administrations (Star 12August 1994).
t t The role of Leninist ideologies in promoting a statist view of development is not
discussed here since the labour movement in South Africa has been more of la 'social
movement' than a Leninist strike force.
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The role of the Development Bank of South Africa in implementing development is
particularly worth examining: given its history as the institution charged with the job of
implementing separate development, the Bank bungs with it a technical and
authoritarian tradition, with a recent superficial gloss of community accountability. It
has played a key role in formulating first drafts on important documents, such as Terms
of Reference for the various task teams. An analysis of these documents shows a poor
understanding of the 'new' vision of development needed for a 'new' South Africa:
bureaucratic structures abound, with multiple lines of authority (see for example the
Terms Of Reference for the Urban Development (~..lSk Team of the RDP). The central
concern continues to be control- even if phrased as a desire for" co-ordination'.
In July 1994, compromising statements by then Chairman of the 'Bank's Finance
Committee, Desmond Krogh, were leaked to the press and. led to his resignation
(Weekend Star 9 July 1994). These proposed an approach to undermine the RDP, and
serve as an indication of the depth of the BanJ..:'sdifficulties in changing its nature. While
the Bank has responded by extravagantly 'sv.~~aring allegiance' to the Programme, it
remains a problem that South Africa's premier development institution continues to be
tinged with an apartheid mentality and staffed. by the same people responsible for
implementing separate development under the apartheid state.
It is difficult to generalise about the business community's approach to development,
Besides individuals' personal differences relating to ethnidty, backgrounds, age, and
experience, there are differences between various types of institudons. There would
appear to be a difference between the capacity of banks and financial institutions to
participate in developmental projects. Certain respondents argues that while inst. ':tions
are risk takers because they are obliged to be since they have to take a long view oi::
investments, banks are not .Jl.tervir.w: DW). Others take a different position, arguing
that while banks are more prepared to take risks, life offices and othe; mstitutional
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investors are more risk averse (Interview: JR). This latter view is shared by a researcher
from the Labour Research Services (LRS), who says that Life Offices are extremely
conservative and reluctant to invest in anything that does not have a virtually
guaranteed return (Interview: MA).
A case in point is ESCOM's Electrification Participation Notes (EPN) issue, a deal
brokered by Theta Securities. Daan \tVandrag claims that every investment house he
approached invested; but that no banks are participating. He argues that
'banks are spoiled: they have been concentrating forever on lending to
blue chips and high net-worth individuals. Everything black to them is
risky, and more expensive, so they stay away. Small loans are seen as
expensive, particularly the handling costs. Banks operate off the British
system which is not appropriate to South Africa. It's too formal and
restrictive. I've taken deals to banks and been rejected, but taken the same
thing to insurance houses and had them accepted. Banks will find a
reason not to invest, while institutions have to be more proactive: they
have to see what can be done to productively use their assets:
More than two thirds of the respondents disagreed with this view, supporting that
proposed by the respondent from the LRS. For example, the Senior Investment Manager
of African Life argues that banks can afford to be more innovative, and that itwas they
who got the options and futures markets operating in South Africa, at risk to
themselves, Institutions, on the other hand, because their performance is so minutely
monitored every quarter, are obliged to constantly "look over their shoulders', Life
offices are obliged not to move too far from the norm, since this will attract unwanted
attention from trustees. He claims that it is only at quarter-ends that one will see big
movements in the shares held by institutions ..and even in this the big players tend to get
followed.
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Of the respondents who directly answered questions on how they saw South African
investors risk profile, half saw them as averse to taking risks, a small number felt that it
varied from investor to investor, and a quarter felt they are "dead centre' on a risk averse
to enterprising continuum. All the respondents who work for stockbrokers felt investors
are risk averse, while the merchant bankers were equally divided between risk averse
and dead centre, as were the senior investment managers at the life offices. None of the
respondents felt that South African investors are imaginative or prepared to take risks.
One of the respondents based in a brokerage firm stated that investors are 'only just up
from deathly dull' (Interview: GS). A senior market analyst at a prominent stockbroking
firm argues that South Africa has sophisticated institutional investors, but that
"we are not cowboys like the Americans. Local managers look very
comprehensively at performance before investing. And I must say that
they are good at their jobs as any mangers I have seen offshore. Although
I will admit that this is not a competitive environment because of the
hothouse effect. Our small market offers few options really' (Interview:
MP).
It can be seen that South African investors do not feel themselves to be particularly
prone to taking risks, and the majority of them recognise their own cautious nature. TI-Js
was never defended or seen as something positive: it is clearly something investors feel
needs justification, and reasons for this risk aversion were offered in most instances, TIle
reasons offered have been detailed above in the section on the market.
Generally, the comment by political analyst Gary van Staden seems correct: he says that
South Africans have lost the skill of taking risks and of being entrepreneurs. The effect
has been the consolidation of a business sector which is generally 'very boring. This is
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partly due to our domestic policies which have for the past half century been very
introspective and has also been produced by the silent alliance between the business
community and the South African Government, in which business quietly agreed to
hold the line and stay silent' (Interview: GS).
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPl\1ENT INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
It should be clear that the RDP is a well intentioned programme which faces the
challenges &0 common in most developing countries, of institutions, processes, missing
capacity and tensions between the central and regional governments. At the same time
..he local govemment elections planned for April next year are getting closer,which puts
pressure on politicians to be seen to be delivering on election promises. An additional
pressure is that within five years sufficient gains must be visible to the electorate to vote
the ANC back into power.
These political pressure translate into pressure on the RDP to deliver effectively and
quickly. The'World Bank has established an office in Johannesburg with a very 10'\-\7
profile, and has undertaken a series of research projects, most of which are concerned
with black economic empowerment. Beyond these few interventions it is ominously
quiet. This may have something to do with the series of meetings held recently to assess
the IMF and World Bank's.roles in the international economy. The rise of extremely
profitable 'emerging market' financiers has led to doubts about the need for the World
Bank to play this role, except in the 'basket caseeconomies' of Africa and Latin America
(where it has had its fewest successes).
It is clear that the World Bank needs a high profile success which would assist in
guaranteein.g its place in the new international economic order: South Africa could
conceivably play that role - provided it succeeds. The Bank offers technical expertise,
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resources and experience which may make up for South African deficiencies incapacity.
For these and other reasons it is not unlikely that the Bank will be invited to playa role
in the RDP in the medium to longer term. (It must be pointed out that this is a
speculative argument: there is nothing conclusive in the press or in government policy
at the moment which would suggest that this is the case.)"
Extremely telling has been the caution with which international investors have
approached SOllt,h Africa's markets: there has been no flood of investment into the post-
apartheid South Africa, 'Over the years I have become very cynical about deals put
together by foreigners: You hear lots of talk, a lot of notebooks, but no chequebooks'
commented one respondent (Interview: DW). 'Most of the grants made by international
financing agents have strings very firmly attached, the money is not unconditional, and
these funds are often used to achieve the objectives of the groups which made them
available, which is often at odds with what local needs are' (ibid).
Ultimately, South Africa will have to rely on local processes and initiatives, and most
important, local resources to finance its development push. This point has been
recognised by the state, and the point was made by Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo,
when he told Parliament that 'Members should take note that South Africa cannot bank
on long-term development assistance from abroad as an input into the RDP' (Citizen: 9
August 1994). Few respondents expect much in the way of support from international
investors. The work of drawing South African investors into the development process is
a priority if development is to .ake place at all.
12 There are of course many international agencies which have been active in South
Africa for a number of years now: these include Oxfam, the European Union, various
sectarian German foundations, and Canada's IDRC to mention a few. These playa range
of roles, primarily offering resources to NGOs and community grOUpb
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CHAPfEB. FOUR: ACfIONS - 'W"HATTHEY DO AND HOW
Inorder to understand how private investors could possibly participate indevelopment
projects, it is necessary to look at what kinds of action take place in each of the two
sectors, and to fry and construct a deeper understanding of the processes of investment,
as well as what actions are involved in trying to l.<fidertake'development'. This chapter
looks firstly at the arenas in which development and investment take place, the types of
action involved in both investment and development, and finally the results of both
invest. . -it and development.
ARENAS
The first arena in which. development will take place inSouth Africa will be a political
one, primarily in the form ot Parliament: legislation to enable the RDP to be
implemented will first have to be passed, wl ich will enable the various Departments
and agencies, as well as NGOs and OUtE'ractors to have their roles mapped out for them.
A brief review of two key pieces of proposed legislation is therefore undertaken.
The first key piece of legislation to be tabled is the Development FacilitationAct which
aims to eliminate the red tape hampering the state's attempts to construct hOlL~S and
meet other social backlogs. This Act will combine for full effect with the RDP Fund Act
passed in June, which provided for the establishment of an RDP Fund to be used for
RDP projects and which will hold funds from all sources. It is to be controlled by the
Minister responsible for the RDP but held by theReserveBank.
AU existing legislation is currently under review as part of the framing of the
Development Facilitation A~t, and new laws will aim to create new rights and
obligations for various parties. Another key set of legislation will be labour laws which
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will aim to equalise power relations between employers and workers. Minister Naidoo
argues that since the RDP is about empowering communities to take the decisions they
need, comprehensive changes to existing legislation is needed (Sunday Times August 14
1994).
Naidoo argues that government will aim for transparent decision making, and that all
parties will have full access to proceedings. This, he claims will eliminate the need for
lobbying, but this seems unlikely. The new state has already shown a marked
propensity to meet interest groups, and it seems that an American system of private
pressure and interest groups will be difficult to avoid, particularly given the
inex perience of many of our legislators.
Implementation of development projects will be undertaken at a community level,
making this vague and contested term an important arena in the new political
landscape. The notion of communities was an important component in resistance to
apartheid. Whether one prioritised the role of "communities' or 'workers' was one of the
key political distinctions of the 19805, and caused many deep rifts amongst groups
committed to ending apartheid. Civic associations, for example, based their claims to
legitimacy on the fact that they represent 'the community'. The elevation of civics to the
status of full partner on the newly constituted National Economic Labour and
Development Council, which replaces the National Manpower Commission and the
National Economic Forum, is an indication of the seriousness with which the new
political order views community organisations.
A valid critique of this way of understanding development is that the term 'community'
often obscures as much as it reveals, failing to state exactly who is represented in the
community, and more importantly, who is not. This point is well made by Friedman
who argues in his paper 'Imagined Communities' (1993), that the term homogenises a
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range of different interests and is consequently of limited value, since it suggests a moral
highground based on representivity, but which is often simply not present. Inhis paper,
he describes the experiences of progressive urban development organisation, Planact,
which drew on the participation of community groups to design and implement a
development project in a squatter settlement on the East Rand. When key components of
the project were destroyed, Planact officials discovered that they had only dealt with the
organised, Visible sectors of tbe 'the community', and had not taken account of those
groups which had an interest in not being seen, such as criminals and illegal
immigrants.
Nevertheless, The RDP uses the tprm. 'communities' widely and uncritica j' calling
oftell. for community participation and suggesting that the final beneficiaries of
development interventions should be communities. While it is now a widely accented
principle that the beneficiaries of development programmes have to be active
participants in every aspect of design and implementation, the looseness of the term
'community' as a description of the target group of development is so vague as to be
dangerous - it Is also an important principle that successful development interventions
are undertaken with clear objectives and targets.
The arena in which investment takes place is the market. However, as with the term
communities, the term 'market' describes little. The approacn taken in this project is that
markets are social institutions, which have similar dynamics and tensions to other social
institutions. Markets contain contradictory opinions, ambivalent actors and competing
interests, while their history, structure and the actions of actors within them make
markets look very different in different settings.
While actors within the market have different perceptions of it, generally the distortions
of the South African market have forced investment decision makers to relate to it as a
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socially constructed institution, and thereby to recognise the importance of acting
directly on it to try and achieve certain ends. While there is a deep conservatism and
aversion to risk-taking embedded in the South African investment sector, there is also
acknowledgement of the need to intervene in the market for certain reasons. Our
national history leans too much to the dirigiste for there to be much of a tradition of
hands-off free-marketeering, The general impression gained from the interviews was
that if there was a policy and investment framework, which made it clear that the
government was committed to certain things required for economic growth, such as
p.dvatisatiofl, investors would put their money into prescribed assets, because they
acknowledge the need to bulwark the 'market economy' against social forces which
undermine its ability to order society. There is an ideological commitment to the market,
but with a tragmatic acknowledgment of the need to supplement and shape it.
Nearly all the respondents recognise that South Africa's investors are affected by our
unique soda-political context, and that investors and markets here behave differently to
their counterparts in other parts of the world. The majority of them felt that this was a
result of factors beyond their own control, particularly exchange control which limits
investors' horizons. One respondent described South Africa's economy as being in an
'incestuous, ingrown situation, caused by foreign exchange control and the dual
currency system which restrict investors to South African markets' (Interview: By).
Another commented that 'the siege mentality which took hold in the 1980s has made
OUf econorny a difficult one to work in' (Interview MB).
Half of the respcndents felt that South Africa does not have investment insf"rtuments thai.
allow imaginative investments ~~ategies that meet the needs of both owners of funds
and people disadvantaged by apartheid. One quarter felt that such instruments do exist,
and the remaining quarter felt that while they do not yet exist, such instruments are
starting to f'merge. There was recognition that in the past investment was generally to
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benefit the white minority (the unending devel' ~~nt of areas like Rosebank, Sandton
and Claremont was mentioned as an example), _ifid 'that this will change in the future,
when there will be a swing to investing in projects that have a broader benefit
(Interview: PT). One senior stockbroking analyst argued that while the various
"investment instruments which have been put together are good, there just aren't
enough of them around. If there is going to be big-scale [socially desirable] investment,
we're gai:.'g to need far more ways of putting your money in' (Interview: NIP). L"1.short,
the general sentiment was that investment instruments could be structured to meet
development needs even if those instruments do not currently exist.
A different point was argued by a political analyst: that there is a desperate lack of
imaginative investment instruments, since no-one takes responsibility for creating
investment instruments. 'The creation of investment opportunities is everyone's
(f
responsibility. Capital must do it to ensure their survival, while civil society has an
interest in shaping the nature of economic growth ... but Iam a bit reassured by the fact
that people are starting to realise that there is no money to be made out of an economic
wasteland' (Interview: GS).
Earlier in this report it was shown that the respondents overwhelmingly supported
market led solutions to problems, arguing that other agencies simply cause distortions,
and that market forces offer immutable laws for distribution and pricing, as well as
ensuring equilibrium (Interviews TBi JRi DP respectively). However, as pointed out
above, the respondents could nevertheless recognise that markets are themselves
influenced by the social context and that it can be moulded and adapted, often in
extremely negative ways. (The only deviation from this general trend was the political
analyst who very consciously recognises the socially produced nature of markets - but
that is after all his job.)
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TYPES OF ACTION
Is the type of action involved in undertaking a development project one in which
irwestors can imagine themselves participating? The answer to this question is
important because once again it is an indicator of the compatibility of the two sectors, of
their ability to interact, and ultimately, the ability of development projects to attract
mvestment on the necessary scale.
Development is necessarily interventionist it involves entering an arena in which there
is a ceficiency, and making an intervention, either through a local agent (which is
generally the most successful strategy), or by working through a body or institution
from outside. This means that development is always disruptive, arguably for the better.
Development is about disruptions and change ..and this can induce tensions and conflict.
An additional tension which should not be overlooked in the evolution of the RDP
particularly, is that of competition between regions and the central state. While seven of
the nine provinces are run by ANe controlled legislatures, which ran on a 'unitary state'
ticket, the effect has nevertheless been the creation of regional governments unwilling to
toe the national line, and keen to govern in their own right.
Wnat this all says about a federal future for South Africa is not yet clear, but the
showdown between PWV Premier Tokyo Sexwale and national Housing Minister Joe
Slovo suggests that regional - national dynamics will be important in tracing the
development of the RDP. The clash was caused by Sexwale trying to get his own
regional housing programme up and running by establishing close links with a specific
construr+on company. It also included an attempt to forge close ties with the Life
Offices Association which represents the massive economic clout of over R40 bn in
assets held by the life assurance industry.
Action in development has come to mean a certain type of action, which is usually
project bound and involves the delivery of a service or a product. A more recent
innovation has been pressures to develop programmes, which are focused around
objectives prepared by analysing problems and reformulating these as goals, The RDP is
structured in this way: each section starts with a problem. statement which is then
reformulated as a vision and an objective.
The actions one would expect of the private sector would relate to the dynamic and
ongoing development of markets, through the vigorous use of investment instruments
and the structuring of options in such a way that investors are aft acted. The interviews
indicated that investors do not feel that this function has been executed. Investors have
short term horizons and have put little energy into the creation of dynamic markets: a
senior market analyst argues that ir the past there has been siege behaviour on the part
of South African business, and that what is needed is a shift to an aggressive,
expansionist approach (Interview:MB).
Half the respondents felt that South African markets have a shorter term orientation
than markets abroad. These sentiments were more noticeable amongst investment
managers at life offices, and less so amongst broking analysts. Two thirds of the
respondents felt that sufficient attention was paid to creating markets, while one fifth.
felt that while attention was paid to the creation of markets, more needed to be done.
The same proportion of respondents felt that not enough was being done to promote the
creation of new markets.
A view was expressed that 'markets take time to develop: you don't just turn on a light
and say here is a market' (Interview: TB).The agency responsible for two of the most
interesting SDlprojects argues against interventions to create markets:
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'Left to the market, solutions to problems will emerge - although. we
recognise that due to political distortions the market has failed. You could
also argue that South Africa has never had a free market, Under these
abnormal conditions you do need interventions, much as Ihate them. But
these need to be carefully done to avoid further distortions, otherwise you
can have the opposite effect and land up hurting people you want to help'
(Interview: DW).
It can be assumed that the opposition to interventions refers to interventions by the state:
this reveals an interesting distinction which is drawn between private intervention,
which is seen as not really an intervention, and public intervention, which is a
distorting, and therefore negative, activity .
Amongst investment managers, there was a decided conservatism regarding their work;
'it's not the job of an investment manager to create opportunities. Other people, like
Theta Securities, perform that job. We are here to invest funds! not to invent the vehicles
for investment' (Interview: TB).
The senior investment manager of Standard Merchant Eank argues that South African
investors are risk averse, but extreme in their views, so that if they decide to support an
issue, then it IS extremely well supported, if not, then it will get no support at all
(Interview: SL). While this was projected in the interview as a positive feature since it
was suggested that this indicated that once investors make a decision they run with it to
its logical conclusion, it could also be taken to indicate a lack of individuality amongst
investment decision makers, inwhich few investor stray from the centre, preferring to
stick with the herd.
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Market creation is seen as onJy part of the process of creating viable investment
instruments: the senior investment manager at African Life points out that companies
like ESCOM and Umgeni VV'atcrhave successfully created markets, but what investors
need is guarantees that having bought in, they will be able to get out. Local authority
guarantees are seen as one way of doing this. Attention was drawn to some of the other
strategies which encourage the formation of markets and which are currently starting to
emerge. One of these was the franchising boom which is starting in South Africa. 'But',
commented a senior market analyst, 'franchising may be the answer, but there are lot of
problems with franchising, and none of this answers the question of what we are going
to do with the roc and the SBDC' \interview: MB).
Generally respondents expect there to be greater attention paid to the creation of
markets in the future. The Chairman of a large stockbroking firm. argues that there has
been a focus inSouth Africa on equity markets, which has left the whole area of debt
underdeveloped. 'There are currently lots of openings for creative ideas in the creation
of markets, yet it takes a long time for these things to happen' (Interview: By).
The ebb and flow of finance is another important point to bear in mind when trying to
understand the short term view taken by many investors. results can be manipulated,
and this is so common that quarterly performance results really offer little insight into
long-term performance. Given that quarterly results are so manipulated, the short term
view is an opportunistic one (Interview: }R). While foreign investors see South Africa as
an exciting emerging market, this view is not shared by South Africans, who are
concerned by the two-country dynamic which. divides South Africa into a 1st and a 3rd
World (Interview: GS).
Investors at~as capable as any other people of holding inconsistent and contradictory
views: that the market is always the best possible way of directing resources, yet
72
recognising its ability to be shaped by social forces and the consequent need to act
directly on it for political and social reasons. This is ultimately a positive finding for the
ability of investors to participate in development. That investment decision makers
recognise the need for intervention to shape the market, however that recognition is
phrased, suggests potential participation by business in supporting development.
THE RESULTS OFACfION
The most fundamental questions about development are the most difficult to answer.
The question of whose interests are s-erved through the sophisticated and burgeoning
development sector, with its host of consultants, technical experts, intermediaries and
representatives becomes more and more difficult to answer with certainty, as the
benefits to the most disadvantaged seem to become less and less clear. Is the objective of
development interventions to create modern industrial societies similar to those found
in the prosperou'? North West hemisphere of the globe? This question is particularly
important for sociologists: ifmodernism and progress are the objectives of development,
is sociology, as a modern discipline closely tied up with the industrialisation, a useful
discipline 'with which to assess the efficacy of development?
These fundamental questions are more difficult than ever to answer, and are similar to
some of the questions facing sociology as a disc.pline. Theories of development need to
be understood in relation to debates around one of the most important organising
principles of our age: modernity. The notion that one can identify a stage of growth in
which society matures and has become sufficiently sophisticated as to be 'modern! is an
important element of SOciology. Even if not directly, the concept of movement, change
and growth is important to sociologists for understanding the course of history.
While the work of theorists such as Foucault, Harvey, and other post-modernists have
stripped modernisation theory of much of its credibility, the idea of an inevitable and
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unproblematic movement from the 'traditional' to the 'modem' remains a powerful
metaphor. Its power lies in the comforting thought that no matter how destructtvs'and
damaging modern life seems to be, its intrusions are inevitable ana that there really is
no point in opposing modernity. The work of the 'fAthers' of sociology, Durkheim,
Weh2r and Marx, all. draw heavily on the notion of progress and advancement in their
versions of sociology.
For Durkheim, the development of society is the path from the primitlve to the modem.
TJ:1.etwo phases are so distinct that a number of clear features can be identified:
traditional society is organised around clan or family groups, and there is great social
cohesion; norms and values are shared, and society is governed by a 'mechanical
solidarity'. Each person performs a number of tasks, and because of this limited division
of labour, there is a limited interdependence. As society develops, the tasks become
more specialised and differentiated, and the division of labour more complex. People
become more dependent on each oilier, leading to 'organic solidarity', in which each
part of tile 'organism' - society - work in harmony with other parts to function as a
whole. Norms and rules give way to individualism and free will.
Inlooking at the shift from pre-capitalist societies to capitalist or..es, J;-~1E1xWeber drew on
cultural explanations to as great a degree as Marx and or Durkheim. 'Rationalisaticn' is
the key concept in a Weberian explanation of change: in order to explain why certain
societies become capitalist and others not, cultural abilities to adopt to rationalism are
invoked. Marxist evolutionism is also widely documented: for Marxists the path from
the traditional to the modem is closely tied in with the development of the forces and
relations of production, while structure and function serve as two valuable prisms
through which to observe the growing tensions and contradictions between the two.
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Sociology (including the Economic variety) is thus closely tied up with the modernist
project. At the same time, the relationship between modernism and development is
cloudy: authors such as Sachs (J.993) argue bitterly against 'development' as an attempt
to (Teate clones of the wasteful, greedy and self-destructive societies of the West.
Nevertheless, sociology remains a valuable tool for understanding the processes of
development: it provides systems and mechanisms for dissecting social relationships
and trying to understand the true motives and dynamics behind anyone process.
For example, sociological analysis can be used to understand some of the complex
dynamics behind the RDP, Chapter 2 of the RDP is entitled "Meeting Basic Needs". To
do this the document proposes "programmes to redistribute a substantial amount of
land to landless people, build over one million houses, provide clean water and
sanitation to all, electrify 2,5 million new homes and provide access for all to affordable
health care and telecommunications. The success of these programmes is essential if we
are to achieve peace and security for all' (RD?: 8). Rumb011 (1994) argues that this has
certain social implications: quoting Rahnema (in Sachs 1993'1 she argues that in most
developing countries, neither the production of economic resources and commodities,
nor the extension of social services have necessarily served the poor. She claims th1.t the
RDP infact, is in the business of Interpreting, as well as satisfying, the needs inquestion.
The obvious counter to these arguments is that the ANe went to its constituency and
asked them what they want, and formulated the RDP around their responses. This
seems less and less true: take the example of land. The ANC claims that the rural people
are hungry for land, and this is thus one of the central concerns of the RDP: 'Land is the
most basic need for rural dwellers' (RDP: 19). Yet one of the ANCs most authoritative
advisors, Stan Greenberg, who ran focus groups with voters in rural areas to determine
their policy preferences, says that he 'could not find a single soul who said that what
they wanted was land out of the elections' (Business Day 24 June 1994).
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The Land Question aside, what this indicates is that when action is pre posed by
developmental interventions, even when the institutions concerned claim extensive
consultation and purport to have the ability to speak for others", development is
ultimately about one set of players interpreting the needs and desires of others; the
second point is that sociological analysis is useful to analyse these dynamics. The
reasons why d~velopment projects are initiated is as varied as the projects themselves:
whether they are cynical attempts to maintain the status quo, or meaningful bids to give
ordinary people control over their lives will depend on any number of factors, b!J.t
simple good intentions is the least of the objectives informing development,
If a range of interests inform development initiatives, what is the role of interests in
investment? Is 1.vestment Simply about maximising returns for the owners of the funds,
or are there other forces at playas well? Two thirds of the respondents who addressed
themselves directly to the question of interests replied that it is only the interests of the
owners of funds that can be considered. 'You can't play Father Christmas with other
people's money' was one of the answers that captured the general mood (Interview: TB).
A quarter of the respondents felt that while the interests oi the owners of the funds was
primary, one needs to look at the social context and draw conclusions about the
likelihood of a profit being generated. In this way some cognisance of the social effects
of investment was recognised. A single respondent felt that while a decent return IS the
prime motive, 'investors generally have a fairly strong sense of the community, and
how where they put there money affects. But in the end all this is a function of profit
anyway' (Interview: AJ).
13 Ferguson (1992) discusses some of the results of development interventions which
are not planned in ways which include local communities and the effects this has - the
empowerment of local elites.
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One of the respondents who strongly argued that owners interests must always come
first suggested that perhaps it would be appropriate for the fiduciary responsibility of
life offices to be extended to include broader factors, but at Uris stage this was not seen
as possible for unit trusts and investment bodies (Interview: MP). Taking a very
legalistic approach, he claimed that it was an immutable principle of investment that the
return offered to owners of funds must be the primary determinant in making
investment decisions.
An interesting trend was that the more experienced the respondent, the broader the
view they took 00 fiduciary responsibility: the director of a large stockbroking firm for
example clea-ly distinguished between a narrow and a broad understanding of
fiduciary responsibility, and suggested that on a personal level he tends towards the
more broad interpretation, However, he feels that one needs to gauge how ones clients
feel about the issue and to play it to their requests (Interview: By).
The ethos of only considering the most narrow set of interests is one into which
investors are inducted very quickly, according to a political analyst Gary van Staden, He
argues that there is now a need to broaden the scope of interests taken into account
when making investment decisions, since political successes depend so profoundly on
economic delivery. He points to the urgent need to divert funds from Sandton City to
building houses, 'otherwise there will be no-one to shop in the new shopping malls'
(Interview: GS).
The respondent with most experience in putting Socially desirable investment projects
together, Mr Daan Wandrag of Theta Securities, argues that the way to overcome this
question is to include as many interests as possible. He claims that inclusivity is the best
way to ensure consensus. He also makes the point that every deal must start with a
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clean slate, since one cannot transfer what was done in the past to another project: they
are all different.
Wandrag argues that South African investors behave differently because of their unique
social context 'the environment we work in always affects our decisions. But despite
small context-related difficulties, such as the fact that investors perceive indiscriminate
government spending as a big threat in South Africa (despite all Indications to the
contrary) and the fact that investors generally overreact negatively, there is no major
difference between South African and US investors: the same fundamentals apply.
Assets and liabilities must be matched, they need the same macro-economic discipline'
(Interview DW).
DEVELOPMENT A..'fI\JL .ROWTH
The view most widely held by the research respondents was that growth and
development require the same conditions, and that without economic growth,
development is not possible. The other view, that development makes growth possible
was not found. It was argued that, in the housing sector for. example, "no matter how
inventive banking whizzes are, if the population is still unemployed, they will earn low
wages and never be able to afford housing. The only sustainable way to get these people
involved is to increase economic activity' (Interview: DW).
An interesting response found early on in the interviews was an absence of awareness of
the whole concept of development. When asked how he saw the relationship between
economic growth and development, one respondent replied 'Development?
Development of what?' He went on to argue that development strategies will never
work in South Africa because bureaucracies necessarily 'make a mess of things', He
argues that as we become more African, the style of business is going to change, and
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that corruption and the need for graft is going to become more noticeable: 'We are going
to have to give backhands to get business coming our way', He argued that 'there is 66%
correlation between growth and social upliftrnent, but not always. These things need to
be seen in terms of performance' (Interview: }R). This set of responses indicates the
general pessimism that South African investors feel, while also indicating their need to
quantify the unquantifiable inorder to make sense of them.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
This project aimed to assess the likelihood of the private sector investing in
development, and to identify some of the obstacles to such business involvement. In
order to do this, the approach offered by economic sociology was used, with its focus on
actors and n~tions. The 'sociological imagination' of C. Wright Mills was used to
extrapolate from a set of interviews using a semi-structure questionnaire and a survey of
the press to speculate about the ability of the private sector to interact with development
initiatives.
No claims of representivity are made here: the project does not hope to represent the
ability of an entire sector to participate in a social process. However, given the difficulty
of devising a method for examining two such different sectors, it was felt that there is
room for an exploratory i..'1.VeshJationsuch as this.
The interviews and the press survey indicate a growing together of the two sectors, as
business becomes more familiar with the development sector, specifically as a result of
the widespread acceptance of the RDP, and as market forces become a more widely
accepted agent in development. The interviews also show the malleability of ideology,
shown in the shifts and changes inthe ideologies of both sectors over such a short time.
A more substantive finding is that business will invest in development so long as it is
able to make money out of the transaction, but it remains constrained by a number of
factors, the most important of which is its embeddedness in a context which is not
sensitive to development processes. This makes development seem a risky investment
option, and therefore less attractive investment option. Other constraints are the
difficulties business experiences in interacting with NGOs and the reliance of investors
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on market explanations for social problems, at the expense of their ability to view state
involvement in the economy positively.
The report highlights the need for private sector investors to be treated as a very
idiosyncratic and important constituency in their own right. There are certain themes
and Issues which always have a resonance for private sector investors across the board,
and these relate to concerns like risk, return and performance. In order to make
themselves attractive investment options, development initiatives need to speak in these
terms, but usually simply do not have the capacity to do so (exceptions would be major
utility companies like Escom) - and one could argue that if they tried to develop such a
capacity it would be to the detriment of their ability to act as development agents, wrJ.(;\
requires a focus on empowerment and participation.
This is the central finding of the research report that for business to become involved in
development, it requires intermediaries, and further, tb at the nature of these
intermediaries will be important A public sector development authority which brokers
deals between private investors (such as insurance companies and pension funds) and
local development agents providing public goods and services (such as private sub-
contractors and local governments or utility companies) will have a very different effect
to a private profit-making company (such as Theta Securities) playing such a role A
public agency could also make concerted efforts to build vendor capacity during
delivery, thereby contributing to sustainability.
ACfORS
The report first looked at what actors are active in each of the two sectors and argued
that while each sector prioritises a different set of actors, they are neither necessarily nor
structurally exclusive. It was shown that state involvement in the economy is viewed
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very negatively by private investors, but that this is at least partly an historically and
ideologically produced phenomenon, not necessarily relateu to the task of investment
management The manner in which investors view the role of the state and the degree to
which they tolerate the state involvement inthe economy is related as much to their own
experience and personal background as i~ is to their being members of the capitalist
class.
This says much about the socially constructed naeure, and therefore the flexibility of
many ideologies, and underlines the usefulness of economic sociology's concept of
embeddedness since it requires that a range of personal and structural factors are taken
into account in order to make economic decisions effectively. It also suggests that
development projects hoping to find private sector investors would do well to consider
such factors before entering into any relationships.
While the market inseen by many in the development community as destructive and as
a force acting counter to development, it has been allocated an increasingly important
role in the RDP, evidenced in the gradual involvement of financial institutions in the
housing sector, for example. Itwas shown that this is an international trend, as market
forces are increasingly seen by iaternational development agencies as a valid
mechanism for stimulating sustainable development.
This does not mean that 'the market has won': rather, it shows that the market is
understood inmany different ways, and that the manner in which it viewed is socially
produced. Private sector investors hold contradictory and inconsistent views of the
market, fetishising its ability to establish equilibrium, set prices and generally perform
all the tasks nee-classical theorists say it can, ve+also conceding that its ability to operate
was constrained by the dead arm of the apartheid state. In short, despite their faith in
the ability of the market to direct economic activity, they nevertheless see it as a social
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institution, moulded and shaped by the context in which it operates. This view is
necessary for adherents to market principles to be able to explain its failure inmany
settings, not least apartheid South Africa.
The serious obstacle to private sector investment in development identified by the
project was the fact that the Third Sector, and more specifically NGOs, are just about
unknown to investment professionals. It was shown that NGOs have come to be seen by
development practitioners all over the world, for a range of different reasons, as flexible,
innovative and dynamic development actors, able to get to where states and markets
have failed. Tne fact that investors do not understand the NCO sector, with its locally
produced imperatives and histories, and its important lobby and advocacy components
means that there is a mismatch between the two groups, which will impact negatively
on their ability to work together and add value in the process.
ACTIONS
The second section of the report looked at the actions Undertaken inboth development
and investment, the arenas inwhich these actions are undertaken, and their results. It
was shown how development actions i..11. South Africa have come to be understood as
part of a delivery-oriented process, with a short term focus being the result of the
emphasis on delivery, to the detriment of the ability or development actors to
concentrate on process-related issues such as capacity building and empowerment. This
stress on the short term will impact negatively on the ability of development
programmes in South Africa to meet their objectives, since development, in order to be
sustainable, needs to be seen as a long term project, particularly in the context of human
resource development.
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st was suggested that the first arena in which development will take place will be a
political one, with Parliament and legislative processes identified as the key mechanisms
by which development will be initiated, It was further suggested that because of the
statist tone of the RDP, government departments, which wm be key implementing
agents, or at best responsible for coordination and facilitation, will form. an important
arena of action. Tensions between the old bureaucratic order and the new will form. an
important dynamic which will act signilicantly on the outcome of development
initiatives. The ability of the new political order to substantially change the nature of its
government departments must be questioned, and this very issue comprises the most
powerful reason why the state should be looking to outside agencies (and particularly
NGOs) to implement the RDP as much as possible.
The second arena ideil.aned was that of communities, and the difficulties asscctated
with. using the term in an increasingly technical sector were raised. Development is no
longer simply .about helping needy people: it is concerned with very exact
measurements of impacts, and indicators for doing so. The vagueness of the term
'community' and the difficulties associated with treating it as an unit of analysis, itwas
suggested, will make implementation of the RDP difficult, particulary if it does not
define its target groups more clearly.
Distinct from the arenas in which development takes place (namely through the state
and in communities), the point was made that investment takes place in the market,
which serves ultimately as both an actor (in the minds of mvestors) and an arena. It was
suggested that the power of this ideological construct - the market - could be an obstacle
to private sector involvement in development. It was shown that investors have
contradictory understandings of the market, which they hold Simultaneously; that it is
an immutable set of laws which always function to bring equilibrium, but that it is also
shaped by its social context.
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The importance accorded to the market need not necessarily form an Insurmountable
obstacle to private sector involvement in development, provided that development
practitioners use the discourse and ideology of the market strategically, in ways
which se-ve their own needs. By emphasising the poorly developed nature of
markets in South Africa, and framing initiatives in terms of encouraging access to
markets and enhancing demand, itwould be possible to generate a large enough area
of consensus for development projects to draw In the private sector.
For development agents to use market-based ideologies to promote development would
require a more subtle and socially .embedded analysis of the market, and of the
opportunities that the devotion of the private sector t';- it offers. Whether the South
African development community has t!le capacity to shake off its antipathy tv market
forces remains to be seen, but given that few development practitioners have had much
experience in dealing with the marlu:": there are few reasons to be optimistic about these
prospects.
Development is an intervenfionis- »rocess which brings change and disrupts established
ways of doing things. investment, by contrast, claims to operate by harnessing existing
relations, primarily through the market. Ho=ever, the central argument of this project is
that market relations are not inherent in all social systems, but have to be introduced,
and are as socially produced as any others. In this way there is an overlap between the
types of action in development and those in investment. The disjuncture exists in that
investment shrouds its interventions in the argument that markets exist naturally
everywhere, providing development initiatives with few access points for collaboration
and cooperation. The additional point made inthe study is the peculiar nature of South
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Africa's markets, which are flabby and un competitive, with. collusion in certain sectors
and an aversion to risk taking recoguised even by investors.
In trying to understand what the results of development actions are, one is drawn into
the broad debates about the future of our societies, and the critical choices that face us
over the next few decades. Envirorunental degradation particularly has made questions
about the type of future we are trying to build increasingly important: the West may, as
Marx claimed, reveal the future of other developing societies, but whether this :s
desirable is another question. Industrial find technological progress seems to offer less
and less to unborn generations, and development interventions are being forced to
grapple with this question: what are we trying to 'develop' into?
As a discipline which emerged out of the Industrial Revolution and which has had its
own evolution tied up wit.h the modernist project, the questions raised here are of
special importance for sociologists. Post-modernist has a few points to make on these
issues, yet remains ultimately limited by its status as a critique of modernism - it fails to
offer a competing vision. In rejecting master narratives and universal truths, post
modernism explicitly confirms that it cannot offer a vision to use as a guide for
de pment.
Both development and investment are about interests. Development in particular
embodies a process in which one group of people speaks on behalf of another.
Developmeru iwolves undertaking actions on behalf of others, even if one does aim to
include them as much as possible, through participatory techniques. For investors,
interests are viewed narrowly: most investment professionals understand fiduciary
responsibility in a very limited way, and feel that if they were to take broader social
concerns into account when placing funds, they would ineffect be playing 'roulette' or
assuming 'a Father Christmas role' with other peoples money (Interview: TB).
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An interesting trend identified in the report is that more experienced inver 'ors have a
wider understanding of fiduciary responsibility, and would want to include more
developmental projects in their portfolios. This suggest two things: firstly that the longer
one is involved in investment the more one becomes aware of the impact of social
factors on the investment environment, leading to a greater willingness to use the
market as a mechanism to bolster desirable social developments. The second point is
that the high degree of correlation between adherence to free market ideologies and
narrowness of the view of fiduciary responsibility (as well as the correlation between the
converse views) suggest that the narrow {Tee market understanding of fiduciary
responsibility is also a relatively recent innovation, tied up with. the intentional
promotion of market values inSouth African. society.
CONCLUSION
Development in the South African context has come to focus on delivery, giving it a
short term character. This does not mean that development is a short term process, but
that this is its nature in South Africa at the moment. Due to the enormous backlogs
created by apartheid, along with the tenuousness of our political stability, delivery is
what counts. Politically, a great deal dp'?ends on the ability of the development sector to
deliver social goods and services, a fact increasingly recognised by the investors. Despite
their very voluble commitment to development in the form of the RDP, there are serious
limits on the ability of the two sectors to cooperate.
The antipathy of investors toward the state, while partly an ideological construct which
can be eroded, will form a major obstacle to fruitful collaboration by the private sector in
development. Housing will be the area in which investors will be most comfortable
putting resources, since there is a product and a consumer liable for payment, whose
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assets can be attached and against whom summonses can be issues. It is unclear whether
this degree of involvement will be sufficient. Other processes, particularly those related
to dealing with a traumatised population of young people, primary health care in the
context of a growing AIDS epidemic, the provision of basic infrastructure and of a social
support system will require a commitment to less tangible investment and less of a
bankable return.
There is substantial potential for private sector involvement on key areas of
development, where the components of a good investment exist, viz low risk, and a
secure return with adequate performance. But there are serious limits on the ability of
the 1:1/110 sectors to mesh without the use of intermediaries, given their different
objectives and methods of operating. This all points to the need for a non-profit or
public sector brokerage able to facilitate dialogue between investors and development
practitioners.
The potential for efficient and effective public / private partnerships exists - investors
recognise the political importance of the sector ~ but that potential needs to be
developed, This should be undertaken by a public agency, possibly with a high degree
of private sector representation, and represents an important task if development is to be
sustainable and people-driven, as the 'Visionof the RDP suggests it should be.
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Press Review
The review section of this research involved a daily scan of the following newspapers
for eight months, from May to December 1994:
Business Day
The Citizen
Finance Week
Finansies en Tegni.es
The Financial Mail
New Nation
The Sowetan
The Star
The Sunday Times
The Weekly Mail and Guardian
Other ad hoc and occasional publications were also reviewed, including prospectuses,
submmissions from various organisations on the RDI', as well as briefing documents.
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APPENDIX ONE: Respondents:
Structured Interviews:
Daan Wandrag
Executive Director; SDI
Theta Securities
Bill Yeowart
Chairman
Simpson McKie
Mike Brown
Senior Investment Analyst
Frankel Pollak Vinderine
Gaq van Staden
Political Analyst
Kaplan and Stewart
Dennis Paizes
Deputy General Manager: Investment
Fedsure
Steve Buck
Senior Manager: Primary Capital Market Securities
First Merchant Bank
Jeremy Roberts
Senior Manager: Investments
..'\f'LmLife
Adam Jacobs
Senior Economist
ABSA
TheoBotha
Manager: Investment Division
UAL Merchant Bank
Nigel Franks
Senior Partner
Nigel Franks and Assocs
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Mr Sylvio Leferbv
Genior Manager: Investments
Standard Bank Investment Corporation
Mr Manny Pob!
Senior Analyst
Davis Borkum Hare and Co
Peter Theunissen
Regional Manager: Investments
Old Mutual
Jim Buys
Senior Economic Consultant
Anglo American Corporation
Unstru chrred interviews:
Brian vVhittaker (BW),
Executive Director:
Urban Foundation
Lance Japhet (LJ)
Managers - Financial Resources:
TJrban Foundation;
Hugh McLean (HM),
Programme Officer:
Liberty Life
Nick Segal (NS),
Alternate Director:
Group Consultant, Strategy and Public Affairs:
Je!
Mark Gonsalves (MG),
CSI Manager:
IO;
Kenneth Clarke (KC),
Editor:
CSI Newsletter.
Mark Anderson (MA)
Researcher
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Labour Research Services.
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APPENDIX TWO: Interview Schedule
DECISION MAKING
1. What systems do you use to make investment decisions? What variables other
than market performance come into play? How do you obtain the information
you need? Does this information meet your needs? Are there any obvious gaps?
2. Are South Africa's markets sufficiently competitive? It is said that the lack of
countervailing forces (unions, the state, civil society) in South Africa's markets
fosters collusion and oligopolies. Do you agree? How can this be changed?
3. How much discretion do you or individu.al investment managers have in making
investment decisions? What limits or constraints are placed on you by the
institution, your peers and senior managers? Are you / they 'punished for taking
risks' (eg if they back a non-blue chip investment that looked promising but
which failed to perform)?
SOUTH AFRICA
4. On a risk averse-to-enterprising continuum, how would you describe South
Africa's institutional investors? Do you think that investors, particularly
institutional ones, are imaginative? What do you think accounts for this?
5. When investors and their managers place funds, are the only interests that
inform their decisions those of the owners of the funds? Do you think other
interests should be considered. If so, what mechanisms would allow this to
happen?
6. Do you think "short-termism' is more of a phenomenon in South Africa than in
other markets? Why?
7. Is sufficient attention paid to creating markets, for example in bond issues by
local authorities,
DEVELOPMENT
8. What do you think the relationship between social advamcement (development)
and economic growth is? Do they require the same conditions?
9. Does South Africa have instruments that will allow imaginative investment
strategies that meec the needs or both owners and people disadvantaged by
apartheid?
10. How do you view prescribed assets? Would you prefer them to an investment
code of conduct? Are there preferable ways for the state to direct investment?
11. Does our unique socio-political context influence investment activity in distinct
wuys? Do you think South African investors operate differently to international
investors operating in our markets?
RACE AND GENDER
12. Do you think the race and gender profile of portfolio managers is a problem? If
there were more black investment managers operating, would the investment
community make different decisions?
PEFSONAL
13. Personal biography: age, background, formative work experience, reading
material, schooling and postgraduate education, political affiliations.
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